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PREFACE 
Several weeks before the 1973 spring semester began, Dr. Walter 
J. Ward, graduate studies chairman, School of Journalism and Broad-
casting at Oklahoma State University challenged me to help him devise 
an instructional situation whereby students enrolled in a general 
semantics class might have a clearer understanding of general seman-
tics concepts. 
The fundamental structure of general semantics (as I viewed it at 
that time) outlined a process of abstracting which might be used as a 
technique for relating language behavior to observable reality. This 
process potentially restructures usual modes of thought and response 
and perhaps can be understood only to the extent that the individual 
internalizes the abstraction processes and is able to put them into 
practice. 
The question for Dr. Ward and I then became, if general semantics 
outlines a method for extensional behavior, how might we provide an 
educational environment whereby students might practice or behave in 
accordance with the principles they were learning about? 
We decided to institute in-class panel discussions where three 
students would take a stand on some controversial topic and class 
members would questj_on them about their beliefs and opinions. 
We felt if students were provided a forum which encouraged asking 
and answering questions they might be able to experience the necessity 
iii 
for relating verbal symbols with observed reality and the importance 
for sharing referents for symbols used. We also felt students might 
be able to better understand their own language behavior as well as 
the language behavior of other class members, by applying framework of 
general semantics and process of abstracting to the communication 
observed in the panel discussions. 
The panel discussions were tape recorded and analyzed from the 
overall standpoint of relating language to reality. This project 
attempted to show how communication breakdowns may in part, be caused 
by a failure to abstract properly and adequately, our verbal symbols 
from our non-verbal reality. In its own small way, this study gains 
importance by showing how seemingly unimportant words, and phrases, 
used in seemingly inconsequential ways, can lead to serious or almost 
total connnunication failures. 
Many people will recognize themselves, and/or recognize the im-
pact they have had on the author, in this study. 
I am deeply indebted to Dr. Ward, for time binding with me and 
encouraging me to pursue an understanding of the "monster" which often 
seemed impossible. I also thank Dr. Ward for the valuable learning 
experiences gained through two years of working with him in general 
semantics classes and for his support and suggestions on the project. 
I would like to give special thanks to my "families" in Hays, 
Manhattan, Riley, WaKenney and Kansas City, Kansas; Davis, California; 
Washington D. C.; Long Island and Stillwater, Oklahoma for their un-
solicited backing and encouragement. 
If this thesis were to be dedicated, it would seem appropriate to 
name my brother, Jackson, who unknowingly reared me in the Aristotelian 
orientation and who also helped spark the beginnings of long over-due 
self-introspection and re-evaluation. To "Spook" I am indebted for 
helping me experience some important differences between knowing and 
understanding. 
A special thanks goes to Marlene Masbruch for deciphering the 
manuscripts scribbles into typewritten pages and to Larry Maloney for 
"running the words" around the Oklahoma State campus in my absence. 
My very special long-distance conununicator, Ted Glasse~ provided 
valuable conunents on the rough draft and supplied his own unique 
combination of verbal tongue-lashings,and kind encouraging words to 
help the author through the trials of compiling this work. 
Finally, though verbalisms are never enough, I would like to 
mention P.H. who remains my silent and loving partner from beginning 
to infinity. Without his ever present understanding and kindness, 
this project, I am certain would never have been completed. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This project deals with language behavior and language usage 
in group communication and how the words we use to talk to ourselves 
and with others can facilitate and/or block clear and meaningful 
communication. 
Because language usage is such an integral part of our lives, we 
seldom, if ever, question the words we use, how we use them, and the 
effects they may have on us and on others. 
This project outlines a structure for thinking about the manner 
in which we relate our verbal symbols (words) to the events, things, 
people, etc., we observe (our reality). 
The structure is called the processes of abstracting and is based 
on the general semantic notion that the map (words) is not the same 
thing as the territory (our reality). It is a method of acting or 
behaving and can be measured somewhat by observing how individuals 
consciously and adequately carry out the process of relating symbols 
to reality. 
Subjects for the study were students enrolled in a general seman-
tics class at Oklahoma State University during the spring semester, 
1973. As part of the course requirements, students, in groups of 
three, led panel discussions on a topic of their choice. 
One purpose of the panel presentations was to engage the class in 
, 
a group discussion whereby students might be able to apply the proc~ 
esses of abstracting by demonstrating through their language behavior 
more clear and meaningful communication dialogues. 
This study had three general purposes: 1) to isolate points in 
the discussions where communications failed or disintegrated, 2) to 
analyze the amount of clear and meaningful coJIIJnunication employed by 
each class member and 3) to examine how closely students were exten-
sionalizing (behaving) in accordance with the principles of general 
semantics--the discipline they were studying that semester. 
2 
Content analysis was used to count instances of clear and meaning-
ful communicati~n indices which occurred much less frequently than had 
been expected. Group discussions disintegrated at several points and 
over-all findings showed that students, even though studying the proc~ 
esses of abstracting and extensionalization, were not effectively 
carrying out either of these principles. 
Hopefully, this thesis will provide a foundation for further 
study on the ways we use symbols and the process of abstraction as 
they relate to communication behavior. 
CHAPTER II 
PROCESSES OF ABSTRACTING 
General semantics, Wendell Johnson says, involves the language of 
science whereby hypotheses are drawn and supported or not supported 
through systematic and controlled observation of behavior and/or 
events in reality. Irving Lee believes the discipline is an almost 
direct attack on our disordered modes of thought and response. 1 Gen-
eral semantics, as the author sees it, employs a process whereby one 
may structure his language behavior more closely to the structure of 
observable and/or experiential reality. To understand this process 
and its importance to communication behavior, we first must examine 
our existing language structure which, for the most part, has been 
patterned after what Alfred C. Korzybski calls a traditional Indo-
European (IE) structure. Korzybski labeled the IE structure Aristote-
lian, after the Greek philosopher, Aristotle, who recorded the pattern 
which has shaped our usual habits of observing and talking. 
Traditional IE Language 
Aristotle lived and wrote 23 centuries ago. The rules he ob-
served in his culture, have been passed from generation to generation. 
Johnson states that insofar as we are not scientific, we are essential-
ly Aristotelian in our outlook, in our fundamental attitude, or set, 
or orientation.to life. 2 
4 
When Aristotle observed the people of his culture, and especial-
ly their language behavior, he formulated three laws or fundamental 
premises which he believed described all the language and behavior he 
observed. Johnson states the laws as: A is A: something is either 
3 A or non-A, and something cannot be both A and non-A. 
The Is of Identity: A is A 
The is of identity is perhaps one of the most troublesome aspects 
of our present language structure, one of the most frequently used 
and most often missed. It is easily passed from generation to gener-
ation and seems to begin at an early age when children are taught to 
use the "is." "This is a truck·" 
- ' 
"That is pretty;" "He is a bad 
boy," tend to teach children to think and act as if a thing is what 
it is. Thus, we learn to structure our reality through words. We 
seemingly are unaware that things we observe are a joint product of 
our inner states (emotions, reactions, perceptions, etc.) and the 
object, event, thing, etc., that are observed. 
For example, "He is a bad boy," implies that we are describing 
something which has an innate or inherent "badness" that exists inde-
pendent of~ evaluations of the boy. The misuse of the "is" can 
have serious effects on personal adjustment as well as impair our 
interpersonal communications. First, we imply there is a thing (boy) 
which has a quality (badness). Obviously he is nothing else but bad., 
because he!!. what he!!.• By telling the boy he is bad, ~e place him 
in a category; we label him as possessing qualities of "badness" and-
to live up to our expectation~--he may begin to act b!dly. To say the 
least, we have not helped his self-concept. Second, one must agree 
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that he is bad because there are no exceptions. If one says anything 
is good about the boy, he must be wrong because he (the boy) is bad • 
. -
Then, the argument begins over what "is-bad--is-not-a-bad" boy. 
One way to avoid the is of identity is to describe the specific 
behavior observed. To say, "Yesterday I saw the boy hit Susan on the 
head with a frisbee, 11 is much more descriptive than "The boy is bad." 
It states the actions or events observed, not an abstract trait of a 
boy. The observer refrains from making judgments about this particu-
lar action and does not assume that the boy is bad because he hit 
Susan on the head with a frisbee. 
The dating device as outlined by Korzybski, may be useful here. to 
remind us that the boy's actions yesterday may not be the same as the 
boy's actions tomorrow, next week or next year. In effect, boy today 
is not boy yesterday. This dating device reminds us--as Heraclitus 
reminded us--that reality is dynamic--that no two things are ever 
identical--that nothing is the same twice--and no man can step in the 
same river twice. 4 
A further i:m.plication with the use of the "is" seems to be that 
we have thoroughly examined the subject and have determined the one 
5 best way to describe it. Taking different looks at the bad boy 
might reveal that he is also: 
a little league baseball player 
a son 
a brother 
a piano player 
a dog owner 
a bicycle rider 
a neighbor 
a second grader 
etc. 
Korzybski indicates people's desires to name things once and for 
all--to plug things into a rigid, non-flexible category--has been 
carried over from the traditional philosophical quest to define the 
essence of things: 
This tendency continues to show itself in the "natural 
logic" of unreflective persons who feel that when a 
thing is gamed one has discovered all he needs to know 
about it. 
Labeling, tends to reinforce an unrefective worship of words 
rather than observation and description of the objects or things, 
events or person, etc., which those words (as someone's evaluations 
of) represent. 
Two Values: Either A or Non-A 
6 
This method of speaking and acting is evident when situations are 
divided into two categories and we act as if there can be only one 
alternative; success or failure, good or bad, north or south, white or 
black, etc. The two-valued language is easily spotted by the use of 
adjectives which negates that something or someone could be A and 
non-A depending on the observer's purpose and the physio·-semantico-
organismic context in which he observed. 
The either-or law of the excluded m:lddle reaction seems to ignore 
several fundamental differences which might make.!. difference between 
and/or among things, and rejects all the shades of gray which might 
lie, for example, between the black and white. Considering the above 
example, panel discussions for whom? Under what conditions? At what 
time? Did they not provide the means for everyone in the class? 
Could there have been some aspects at some time for someone which 
provided the means for understanding the course material? 
7 
Johnson suggests that to go through a day sorting this and that 
into two bins, two possibilities, may save time, but it can be 
vicious. He maintains that the either-or is a sick language no matter 
who uses it about whom or what. 7 And it would seem the individual who 
thinks and speaks in terms of dichotomized absolutes might be shocked, 
disillusioned, angered, etc., upon discovering that someone had found 
an alternative(s) to what he had classified. 
Something Cannot be A and Non-A 
The third law indicates a splitting of events on the verbal level 
which cannot be split on the non-verbal. In other words, we can speak 
(verbalize) about things in separate categories which in reality (non-
verbally) do not exist in mutual exclusiveness. 
Things often are discussed in terms of "heart" and "soul" 
-- , 
"space" and "time," "intellect"~ "emotions," etc., as if these 
things could be isolated; as if they were not related to each other. 
One way to avoid this elementalistic verbal splitting of events is to 
use the hyphen, which would change the above to heart-soul, space-
time, intellect-emotions, indicating an awareness of the functional 
relationships which exist in our observable world. 
Another aspect of the elementalistic orientation says there can 
be ~ contradictions in what we say. The drink cannot taste good and 
bad. That would be a contradiction. For example, a man was complain-
ing one day that his three-year-old girl would not get into the bath-
tub because the water, she claimed, was too hot. "I know she was 
faking, because I felt the water and it was luke warm," he said. As 
Johnson says, "What is sauce to the goose may be soup to the gander 
8 
and the deacon glowers when the alderman laughs. 118 The water very 
easily could have felt too hot to the little girl and, at the same 
time, could have felt lukewarm to the man. 
Sununarized, if A is A, then everything must be either A or non-A 
' 
and, of course, nothing can be bo'th A and non-A. Johnson points to 
the Aristotelian individual who assumes an A is A orientation to 
"success," "wealth," etc. If success is success, either one has 
succeeded or he has failed. According to the law of the excluded 
middle one cannot have both. And something cannot be success and 
failure at the same time, if the law of non contradiction is valid. 
The Aristotelian orientation does not take into account the processes 
of sharing verbal symbols with reality. It seems to be a rigid, 
static method of viewing the world in us.and about us; makes no excep-
tions and allows for no contradictions. 
Non-Aristotelian Orientation 
At lease one important difference between the Aristotelian and 
non-Aristotelian (if we can assume pure dichotomies for the purpose of 
discussion) orientation could be that the latter implies awareness 
that language is man-made, not to be considered as merely a human 
characteristic as natural as breathing, swallowing, coughing, etc. 
Aristotle's noted that people act as if, they talk as if, all that 
they feel and believe and live by might be reduced to the three funda-
mental laws discussed above. This suggests that the Aristotelian 
structures his behavior substantially by words (virtually talks him-
self into difficulties). The non-Aristotelian tends toward the oppo-
site. He continually revises and changes his language to correspond 
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as closely as possible with the reality observed. 
Relationship between language and reality is central to under-
standing language behavior and communication. Of primary importance 
is that words are words and !!2..!!?.!!.• They are man-made symbols, used 
to represent observable events, things, objects, etc., and/or to de-
scribe unobservable phenomenon. 
If the structure of language is to correspond adequately to the 
structure of 'reality, the fundamental problem concerns the correspond-
ence of words to facts. 
Degree of Differentiation 
Facts, in the non-Aristotelian sense, refer to observable events: 
things which can be sensed neurally through sight, smell, sound, taste 
and touch.* Johnson says there are four things about a fact which 
should be clear: 1) it is necessarily incomplete. What we observe 
is no more than an abstract of the total situation. We can never ob-
serve all there is to observe about any one event; 2) it changes. 
What we observe is little more than a quick glimpse of a ceaseless 
transformation; 3) a fact is a personal affair because it is the ob-
servation by an individual and 4) a fact's usefulness depends on the 
degree to which others agree with you concerning it. 9 
Because a fact occurs but once in ever-changing reality, the 
structure of reality shows a practically infinite degree of differen-
tiation. Our language by comparison is highly undifferentiated, fixed 
*Facts refer to observable events o~ the macroscopic and micro-
scopic levels (see page 13). Called first-order facts, these things 
include everything ~hat can be neurally ~nd extra-neurally sensed. 
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and static. Words car:ry the burden of representing a great number and 
variety of facts and the same words can symbolize many different 
things to different people. Johnson says much of our apparent confu-
sion is due to this simple fact: that there are more things to be 
spoken of than there are words with which to speak of them. 
A rather large share of our misunderstandings and disa-
greements arises not so much because we are constitu-
tionally stupid or stubborn but simply because we have 
to use the same words to refer to so many different 
things. 10 
Problems in understanding and in communication are found when we 
insist on perceiving from an either-or conceptual fr~ework which 
allows for differentiation between two categories only. 
Variability 
Johnson suggests that all our words a.re in some measure "ab-
stract" or generalized because there are, at any given moment, more 
facts than there are words with which to refer to them. With the pas-
sage of time, new words are formulated, old ones outdated and even as 
new information is found and written, it is to some extent out of date 
upon its publication. 
Maladjustments, for the individual or for society, lie 
in mistaking the verbal record of the past for the 
description of the present. Because the words we speak 
today are quite the same as the ones we spoke yesterday, 
we tend to create the illusion that what we speak about 
is also quite the same. It can be serious enough when 
change takes us by surprise; what is even 1f~re serious is 
to have change escape our notice entirely. 
Because words represent many things, and because words are indi-
vidual abstractions, we 9ften Wile words to talk about words, and make 
I 
statements about other statements, which may or may not bear 
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resemblance to observable reality. The ability to make statements a-
bout statements about statements etc., is called self-reflexiveness 
and illustrates the potentially continuous nature of our abstracting 
processes. The self-reflexive nature of language can be beneficial if 
it is understood that there is always more about any situation than 
can be said. However, statements about statements, if taken as state-
ments about reality, can manifest into fanciful delusions and miscon-
ceptions, which may enhance communication breakdowns. 
Closely related to the self-reflexive nature of language is the 
use of multi-ordinal words. Such words as learning, education, soci-
ety, system, democracy are referred to as multi-ordinal words because 
such terms have no general meaning. What the word means to its user 
is determined by the context in which he is using it. 
As Johnson notes, each time a multi-ordinal word is used, it 
means something different and because multi-ordinal words have no gen-
eral meaning they cannot be tied to observable reality. Practically 
the only way a multi-ordinal word can be defined is by using other 
multi-ordinal words, making the sharing of referents for symbols non-
existent. In self-reflexive conversations, one can argue about argu-
ing, object to objections of objections until the issue becomes 
thoroughly confused or forgotten. In any case, agreemen~ is not 
facilitated. 
Johnson indicates that the Aristotelian language structure is one 
which leads to misevaluation and confusion of words with the facts--
events, things, objects, etc., they represent. 12 When words do not 
correspond with facts, (when self-reflex.iveness runs rampant) it is 
time for us to part with words and retutn to facts. 
The basic structure of the Aristotelian system will make easier 
the understanding of the non-Aristotelian or scientific language 
structure. 
Abstraction Ladder 
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The fundamental relationship between language and reality seems 
ignored in the Aristotelian orientation described above. This rela-
tionship centers on the process of ABSTRACTING. Two fundamental as-
pects of abstracting are, 1) that abstracting is a process of 
choosing, selecting one by one, assimilating and synthesizing into a 
structure, elements born of relating oneself to the world about him 
and the world in him and 2) in abstracting we deal with the several 
manifestations of the basic fact that one operates with leiss than 
complete information--one always deals with abstracts and further ab-
stractions can always be made from present abstracts. 
It is useful to visualize the abstraction process in the form of 
Johnson's schematic diagram called the abstraction ladder. In order 
to better understand the following analysis of group discussions an 
examination of each of the levels will be discussed. The symbolic 
ladder, on page 13 as shown in Figure 1, is based on Johnson's dia-
grams from People in Quandaries, and Living with Change. 
The horizontal line through the middle of the imagineiry ladder 
divides the non-verbal world from the verbal world. The former is 
often referred to as the "territory" and the latter as the "map," 
emphasizing that verbal symbols are no more than representations (or 
abstracts) of some of the events, things, people, etc., observed in 
the non-verbal territory. 
MAP 
(verbal) 
Etc. 
Relations 
Classifying 
Descriptive 
Verbal Facts 
TERRITORY 
(non-verbal) 
Macroscopic 
Microscopic 
Submicroscopic 
+ 
Self-Reflexiveness 
Explaining, 
Making Judgments 
Noting Similarities 
First Order 
Verbal Facts 
Unaided Senses 
Sight, Smell, Taste 
Touch, Sound 
Extra-neural Devices 
Inferential Data 
Figure 1. Abstraction Ladder Based on Wendell Johuson's schematic 
Diagra1111 from People in Quandaries an~ LiTin& 
With Chana• · 
13 
14 
Note, as the levels progress upwards in the territory, less 
broken lines are used, illustrating that on the lower levels of ab-
straction the more dynamic and process-like does reality appear to be. 
The map section of the ladder also shows less detail as the 
levels progress upwards emphasizing that as abstractions are farther 
removed from the low descriptive levels, the words become more gener-
al, simplified and abstract. 
The oval line to the right of the diagram, shows movement through 
the process. This line emphasizes that if one is conscious of ab-
stracting one continually checks the word against the thing and moves 
between the verbal and the non-verbal levels. 
Five points about the abstraction process according to Johnson, 
should be kept in mind when viewing the abstraction ladder. 1) the 
process of abstracting involves a verbal world and a non-verbal world, 
that is, a world of words-but-not-things and a world of things-but-
not-words; 2) the process requires an honest relationship between 
them; 3) the process, therefore, involves movement back and forth be-
tween these two worlds to accommodate the checking necessary to main-
tain this relationship; 4) the movement, to satisfy these 
requirements, must proceed on an endless path, that runs through the 
worlds and back again, returning on itself in a full circuit; and 5) 
movement along this path is by steps, stages, or levels.13 
Macroscopic· Leve.! 
This level represet1ts facts that calit be observed with unaided 
senses; sight, touch, smell, taste, and sound. It is the realm of 
neural sensing and only to the extent that neural senses function, or 
15 
to the extent that they are used, can observations of the non-verbal 
world be made. 
Microscopic Level 
Observations of reality can be extended on the microscopic level with 
the use of extra-neural devices, such as microscopes, x-ray cameras, 
telescopes, etc. On the extra-neural level we gain a more detailed 
picture of the processes of reality. For example, on the;macroscopic 
level we can see, smell, feel and taste a slice of an orange. On the 
microscopic level, a drop of orange juice viewed under a microscope 
would expose an entirely different "view" of it. Much more informa-
tion could be gained about the orange juice. The macroscopic and 
microscopic levels are the levels of first-order facts, or a reliably 
observed fact. For example, Johnson says, trees have bark, paper burns 
and objects fall. There is no why for these things, they are simply 
14 
observable facts. 
Johnson says, life and reality, as we experience them directly, 
are matters of first order fact. 15 However, our ultimate understand-
ing of life and reality is basically in terms of the inferential proc-
ess takes place on the submicroscopic level. 
Submicroscopic Level 
We can never be "sure" of what lies on the submicroscopic levels 
because we have no way of observing processes here. It is a level of 
theorizing or attempting to describe the underlying structure of ob-
servable first-order facts. 
Johnson illustrates the three non-verbal levels with an example: 
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A glass of water can be observed on the macroscopic level, just as it 
sits there, or a droplet of the water may be viewed under a micro-
scope. If you observe the glass over many days you may note that the 
amount of water decreases. No one drinks from the glass and there is 
not a leak in it. You may describe this process in terms of ghosts 
or demons who steal water each night when you are not looking. 
Or, you may describe the process as evaporation and draw theories 
which scientists have done, to describe what the processes of evapo-
ration is believed to consist of. The explanation or theory of evapo-
ration is formed on the submicroscopic level; it seeks to explain 
things that cannot be observed. 
The non-verbal levels are the unspeakable levels--the territory 
which symbolizes our observable, unobserved and unobservable world. 
When we talk to ourselves and when we speak about the territory, 
we enter the verbal world. We constnict maps to symbolize what we 
perceived in the territory. 
Descriptive Level 
Abstractions are incomplete. We can never say all their is to 
say about any observable event (just as we can never observe all there 
is to observe of any event). But, the descriptive level is where we 
can get closest to our observable world. It is called the level of 
first-order VERBAL facts because this is where facts are spoken about 
in as much detail as possible. It is the level of noting differences 
between and among things which make those things unique. We cannot 
go with words below the descriptive level. After describing as 
thoroughly as possible wha~ w, have observed, we can only go lower on 
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the ladder by pointing to or somehow demonstrating non-verbally what 
we mean. When we stop describing and elaborating on differences we 
may abstract further to the level of classification. 
Classifying Level 
It is here that resemblances are noted and one verbalizes bow 
things seem alike or similar to each other. It is sometimes called 
the labeling level because things are classified, categorized, or put 
into either-or piles. Of course, NO TWO THINGS are exactly alike but 
they can resemble each other in one way or another. The person who 
sorts into two piles, good-bad, right-wrong, liberal-conservative, 
either-or is operating on the classifying level. This does not mean 
we should never classify. The difference is that some people deliber-
ately pick segments of the observable world to substantiate their 
classification, which makes words correspond less with actual reality. 
In effect, the descriptive level has been by-passed, sometimes con-
sciously, sometimes unknowingly. But, it is difficult to talk sense 
on this level without first talking sense on the descriptive level. 
In the diagram, the classifying level is illustrated with a plus 
and minus sign to illustrate the either-or nature. The descriptive 
level has many vertical lines illustrating that many details and 
differences are noted. The relations level has no details in the 
rectangular box. It symbolizes a higher abstraction where judgments 
are made, relations drawn and explanations formed. 
Relations Level 
If we consciously and adequately abstract through the verbal 
levels, we first describe, then classify and draw relations based on 
our classifications, and descriptions. 
This level and others can be explained with the following 
example: 
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A: "Why do you read those trashy books? They will turn you into 
a pervert." (drawing relations, making judgments) 
B: "How do you know this book is trashy?" (seeking observable 
facts) 
A: "Anything with a picture like that on the cover is a trashy 
book." (classifying, drawing similarities) 
B: "It doesn't look trashy to me. Have you read the book?" 
(attempt to seek definitions) 
A: "I don't have to. I can tell by looking it is a bad book." 
(emphasizing similarities, making judgments, no first-order fact 
referents) 
In all of the verbal levels we are using a_WORD to represent a 
TIIING. In the case above, because subject A did not proceed normaily 
and continuously through the levels of abstraction, his word trashy 
was undefined--it had no referent in the observable world. It was 
trashy because it was trashy; the word had become the thing. If we 
cannot define our words, either direct1y or indirectly by somehow 
relating them to observable phenomenon, o~r language bears no rela-
tionship to reality. 
The Etc. in the abstraction ladder represents the ability to use 
words to talk about words. This potentially can continue to infinity. 
In other words, there is always more to be said about anything. 
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Etc 
This level represents the self-reflexive nature of human ab-
stracting and symbolizing and can be viewed as both our most helpful 
aspect of abstracting and our most dangerous and potentially damaging. 
The etc. represents the fact that any abstract can be further 
abstracted. Johnson compares this process to our number system. 
There is no such thing as THE largest number, because you can always 
add 1 to any number to make it a larger number. Because our language 
can generate abstracts about abstracts ad infinitum the process is 
referred to as self-reflexive. 
This process makes possible all that we mean by cultural advance. 
As Johnson says, it has made possible the theory of relativity and the 
other revolutionary achievements of modern mathematical physics. It 
is this self-reflexive ability which enables us to formulate theories 
on the submicroscopic levels. 
Self-reflexiveness when it is abused or not recognized and con-
sciously employed has also made possible millions of inferiority com-
plexes and thousands of jealous homicides. If self-reflexiveness runs 
wild, one has to contend with the maladjustments and catastrophies 
that result from gossip, rumor, daydreaming, suspiciousness, and 
delusions, etc. If the self-reflexive process of abstracting is 
carri~d out consciously and adequately it makes possible the potential 
. . 
to CHECK theories, assumptions, beliefs, etc., with relevant observa-
tions and experiences. The arrow in the abstraction ladder (Figure 
1, page 13) indicates our language potentially can be self-corrective. 
The self-corrective process illustrates an important difference 
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between scientific orientation and the Aristotelian orientation. The 
latter is static, does not change and often bears no relationship to 
reality. The former, Johnson notes, ~xplains why scientists "always 
change their minds," and why a scientific "truth" is always tentative, 
subject to change in accordance with further observations to which it 
invariably directs us. 16 
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CHAPTER III 
ABSTRACTION AND HUMAN COMMUNICATION 
The structure of the observable non-verbal reality is process-
like, dynamic and ever changing. To draw accurate maps of this terri-
tory, it is essential to keep our language structure closely coordi-
nated with the non-verbal world and to keep the abstraction process 
free from semantic blockages so that it may be self-corrective. If we 
fail to abstract in an orderly process--to keep the non-verbal and 
verbal levels distinct but coordinated--the words we use to talk to 
ourselves and others can create delusional pictures in our heads and 
seriously hamper our communications with others. Consider the follow-
ing example of almost total disregard for the territory when maps are 
drawn. 
The author grew up in a small Kansas town where most residents 
made a distinct division (discriminated) between Catholics and Protes-
tants. City elections were based, not on traditional party lines, but 
between the Catholics and Protestants. Each group's children attended 
different grade schools and high schools. It was not uncommon to hear 
of families disinheriting children for marrying someone ~f the other 
religion. If you happened to be born a Protestant, everyone unfortu-
nate enough to be born Catholic was immC1ral, stupid, and in general, 
not socially desirable, and vice versa. Most forms of prejudice in-
volve inferences which have no basis whatsoever. The maps bear no 
2') 
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relationship to the territory. 
The more serious ramifications of these inaccurate maps lie in 
the uncritical acceptance of them as true. The words Catholic and 
Protestant in the above example~ numerous things which lead to 
family disinheritances, social snobbery and, at worst, total comm.uni-
cation breakdown--one just doesn't talk to them. 
One key to understanding the process of abstraction lies in the 
concepts of 1) observation, 2) description and 3) inferences. The 
macroscopic and microscopic levels are observable. These are first-
order non-verbal facts. When we speak about them, we leave the non-
verbal world for the verbal. We describe our observations on the 
level of first-order verbal facts as precisely and accurately as 
possible. Inferences based on description of observations are used to 
formulate explanations of the submicroscopic level of inferential 
' data. And because this unobservable level is ever changing, our for-
mulations and theories best be held subject to revision. 
In interpersonal or group communication, people "falling off the 
ladder" can engage in verbal battles where feelings are hurt and 
friendships broken over inaccurately drawn maps and self-reflexiveness 
gone wild. When the levels of abstraction are not kept closely 
coordinated self-correctiveness is not possible. 
Abstraction as a Method of Science 
The abstraction ladder can be viewed as a model for relating lan-
guage behavior to reality. The scientist, whether he pursues the 
study of psychology, education, physics, chemistry, etc., is concerned 
with the systematic and controlled observation of natural phenomenon. 
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When this approach is understood, we probably will wonder why much 
more human thinking and problem solving are not consciously structured 
along such lines. 
When the scientist has opinions or beliefs about a certain rela-
tionship among natural phenomena he begins by: 
Relations 
Classifying 
Describing 
Neural 
Extra-Neural 
Describing 
Relations 
Classifying 
Describing 
Relations 
Classifying 
Describing 
Neural 
Extra-Neural 
Inferential Data 
Asking clear and answerable 
questions (based on classifi-
cations which are based on 
descriptions) in order to 
direct his 
Observations (which may be on 
the neural and/or extra-
neural level) which are made 
in a calm and unprejudiced 
manner, and which are then 
Reported as accurately as 
possible and in such a way 
As to answer the questions 
that were asked to begin 
with, after which, 
Any pertinent beliefs or assumptions 
that were held before the observa-
tions were made were revised (self-
correctiveness) in light of the 
observations made and the answers 
obtained. 
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The scientific method is clearly different from common sense. 
Its process, if carried out consciously and adequately, provides a 
method for revising beliefs, updating theories and keeping abreast of 
the ever-changing events in reality. The common sense approach, in 
contrast, outlines a method of reinforcing beliefs and resisting ob-
servable events or phenomena which might cause a change in opinion. 
The scientific person views his world as a product of himself and 
what he observes. He pursues relations among things. The man-in the 
street assumes an essentially static kind of reality. Things just 
change or are changed. The problem solves itself. The man, as an ob-
server, is not involved. The scientific approach calls for a system-
atic, orderly process of observing what~ be observed and outlines 
a technique for explaining what cannot be observed. 
The conunon approach man views his world through "Utopian 
glasses." He sees only what he wants to see. The unobserved and/or 
unobservables are accounted for by plogglies or with metaphysical 
explanations. And perhaps most important, the common sense man is 
unaware of the self-reflexive nature of his verbal abstractions. Thus 
he can speak about speaking for a lifetime, revealing or gaining 
little insight into the world in which he lives. The scientific indi-
vidual, through orderly abstraction, continually refers his statements 
to observable reality, constantly checking, testing, and revising his 
statements. 
Symptoms of Misevaluation 
We have discussed and explained the importance of keeping the 
levels of abstraction distinct from each other, yet coordinated. The 
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word is not to be taken for the thing. Judgments, conclusions, etc., 
are not to be confused with classifications and the latter are not to 
be confused with detailed description. And description of an event, 
no matter how detailed, is not the event. Abstracting takes place at 
different levels and is a personal affair. As Lee suggests, each in-
dividual abstracts some descriptive statements from the infinite num-
ber of possible events observed and each classifies and draws some 
inferences from these descriptions. 1 
The levels are different, yet they often are confused. This 
leads to misevaluation. Irving Lee says to act as if one level is the 
same as another is to make for faulty responses.2 
When the abstraction levels are confused, several symptoms of 
misevaluations are evident which contribute to cormnunication blockages 
and/or breakdowns. Persons trained in non-Aristotelian language be-
havior can recognize these symptoms in himself and in others. In 
fact, a primary purpose of this project was to analyze such symptoms 
in the language behavior and ensuing communication breakdowns among 
the panel members in the general semantics class. 
These symptoms can be recognized in instances of apparent identi-
fication, allness, unchecked self-reflexiveness and unconscious pro-
jection in overt language behavior. Concurrent with such behavior 
often is the evidential unawareness of probability principles and con-
comitant undelayed or signal reaction to symbols. These symptoms and 
their ramifications are discussed below. 
Identification 
This symptom occurs when the natural order of evaluation is 
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reversed; when, for example, observables are identified with non-ob-
servables, when descriptions are mistaken for observables; and/or when 
inferences are deemed equal to description. 
An example of identification can be seen in the person who has an 
extreme fear of tornadoes. Every time storm clouds fill the sky, he 
rushes to the stonn cellar to be safe from the "approaching tornado." 
The object--clouds--is identified with the inference tornadoes (unob-
served). Such unchecked evaluative fears appear to be undelayed, 
signal reaction. In short, the symbol is seen as the actual inferen-
tial tornado, rather than as a symbol which could stand for many 
forthcoming events of less potential consequence. In contrast is the 
notion of symbol or delayed reaction, in which the symbol is viewed 
not as the thing, but a representation of some thing(s). For example, 
what do a person's words represent on the non-verbal level? The 
signal reaction assumes another's words mean the same as his. The 
symbol reactor stops to ask "What do you mean?" 
s. I. Hayakawa gives a signal reaction example by saying, if you 
are in a railroad station and you want help with your luggage, any 
redcap, or person dressed as a redcap, will do. However, if you want 
to get your luggage back when you get to your taxi, you will no longer 
be content with any'redcap, since only one of them has your luggage. 3 
Hayakawa explains signal reactions as reactions inappropriate to 
the situation at hand because of failure to make differentiations 
which, in that situation, are both relevant and necessary.4 
Lee urges that symbol reaction is necessary to live up to poten-
tialities of nervous systems equipped with organs for discrimination 
(the cortex above all). When this is explained to students, he says, 
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almost regularly they respond, "This is nothing new: my grandmother 
used to tell me to count to ten before I acted. 115 Counting to ten be-
fore responding may or may not have practical value, depending on what 
you do during the counting period. If all one does during the delay 
is count to ten he stands to gain nothing. 
Lee adds that investigations of smart university upperclassmen 
show that those who burst into speech about the obviousness of signal 
reactions are also most likely to burst into action by signal reac-
tions.before they have given attention to what goes on. 6 One might 
say these students can verbalize the principles of symbol reaction, 
but cannot behave in accordance with what they verbally know. Knowing 
the principles or definitions of the terms does little good unless we 
can actualize what we know in everyday behavior. 
The central idea behind symbol reaction is that it takes time to 
evaluate. This is one reason for the need to practice delayed reac-
tions. If one takes time to observe more details of, and differences 
among, seemingly identical objects, ~he responses will be less likely 
to represent identification of the levels of abstraction. 
Allness 
The principle of allness usually is indicated in A-is-A language 
behavior. An allness orientation is based on a one-valued system. 
Such words as all, always, never, everyone, absolutely, .!!2_ ~· are 
characteristic of such language. "No on,e likes to get hurt," "Every-
one should love his country," 11If you've seen one construction con-
tract kickback you've seen 'em all," "S~e a~way,s dres~es grubby," are 
examples of allness statements. There are NO alternativeo. The 
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allness oriented person does not stop to consider that there might be 
more to say or another way to view a situation. 
The allness orientation discounts differences between individu-
als, things, etc., which make a difference. It is a language behavior 
which operates on the level of similarities and relations, or high 
level inferences. The allness statement seems more likely than not to 
provoke or stimulate disagreements and arguments. It can lead to some 
of our greatest communication breakdowns ••••• particularly when two 
allness-oriented people confront each other, as in the following: 
I: "I'm never going to that class again, I have always hated 
it." 
II: "That's stupid. Jones always teaches good classes. Ev,aryone 
on campus thinks so." 
I: "Well everyone is wrong, because he is absolutely the worst. 
Besides, he smokes all the time and it looks vulgar." 
II: "If he wants to smoke, he can. No one else seems to mind." 
I: "I don't like cigarette smoke and I wish you wouldn't smoke 
all the time too." 
In a few short lines, the interchanges have self-reflexed from never 
attending the class to Jones' teaching ability to smoking cigarettes. 
There doesn't seem to be much eit;her of these people could say to each 
other as long as they were speaking in allness terms ••• so they inter-
reflexed from one allness statement to another, saying very little 
about anything on the descriptive level. Consider the obvious fail-
ures to describe any demonstrable aspects of non-verbal environment: 
1) Everyone on campus ••• thinks Jones always teaches good classes (was 
a systematic survey conducted?). 2) Jcines smokes all the time 
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(perhaps only during class) and, 3) Jones is absolutely the worst ••• 
(in comparison to what). 
Our "communicators" have no representative referents for these 
statements on the observable levels. Their allness statements, char-
acteristic of the one-valued orientation bear little or no resemblance 
to an actual territory. 
Keeping in mind that no two things are ever the same and no one 
thing is ever the same twice on non-verbal levels, we hopefully can 
begin to see the relative futility of allness statements that are i-
dentified with the non-verbal levels. 
Unconscious Projection 
The process of abstraction, as mentioned earlier, is a personal 
and private affair. Professor R. D. Carmichael pointed out that the 
universe, as we know it, is a joint product of the observer and the 
observed. 7 This involves what we call projection. As Johnson says, 
adequate projection involves; 1) the degree to which the scientist is 
conscious of his language as an aspect of his own behavior, 2) the 
extent that he realizes his statements are about himself as well as 
about something else that he is apparently talking about, and 3) the 
degree to which he understands that his language is man~made and no 
more reliable and effective than the men who have made it and the men 
8 
who use it. Consider the following from the standpoint of prcijec-
tion: 
A: "The questionrLaire is no good because you cannot study indi-
vidual behavior to begin with. You have to consider that when an 
individual fills out a questionnaire he iQ operating in a different 
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social and cultural framework which is unnatural and in my country, in 
Finland, that kind of thing would be frowned upon. I might even be 
chastized for filling it out to begin with, so I would not give truth-
ful answers. I know that is so, because I know what my countrymen 
think. Therefore the questionnaire is worthless." 
This student displayed no awareness that his statements were a 
product of himself and what he observed. (If anything in this case). 
The questionnaire is worthless because he apparently has decided it 
is. There seems to be no room for argument or disagreement. 
If this individual had made observations in reality he could have 
showed an awareness of projection by saying, "it seems to me," or "it 
appears that," or "I belive," or some words indicating his statements 
were not to be taken as truth but as his personal observations and 
subject to change with additional observations and/or information. 
Johnson notes that with words or expressions which signify "to-
me-ness," one expresses his awareness of the degree to which his 
thoughts or statements are projections of his own internal condition 
rather than reports of facts about something else. 
A consciousness of projection helps discriminate those individu-
als who are aware of the word-fact relationship and those who are not. 
Words are words and nothing more. The process whereby we relate our 
symbols to ~ reality is central to the scientific processes of ab-
stracting, which suggests that we maintain a substantial isomorphic 
connection between our verbal and non-verbal worlds. 
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Unchecked Self-Reflexiveness 
As mentioned earlier, the self-reflexive character of our lan-
guage specifies that we can use language to talk about language, that 
any statement can be abstracted further, that statements can be made 
about statements, etc. 
Self-reflexiveness indicates the infinite number of levels we may 
speak on. Each time we move up to a different level, the meaning of 
the word changes. Words become more abstract than those spoken on the 
level below. 
Mr. !tty Twit,* a fictious (though very believable) character 
created by F. R. Eldridge, illustrates the idea of self-reflexiveness 
of words on different levels by saying "The only thing we have to fear 
is fear itself. 119 What !tty Twit doesn't understand, as Eldridge ex-
plains, is that the word "fear" is u~ed on different levels in the 
statement. Mr. !tty Twit treats "fear" and "fear of fear" as though 
they both meant the same thing. As Eldridge explains to Mr. Itty 
Twit: 
"In words like 'doubt,' 'hate,' etc., the second order 
reverses and annuls the first order effect. You may 
'hate' someone, and then you begin to 'hate hate' and 
you end up not hating anyone. You may 'have contempt' 
of something or someone, and then 'have contempt of 
having contempt' and end up not having contempt of 
anyone."10 
The self-reflexiveness of abstracting is closely tied to multi-
ordinality Almost any word is multiordinal if its referents are not 
*Itty Twit, which stands for I Think That You Think What I Think, 
is a character created by Eldridge, to symbolize the Aristotelian in-
dividual. Eldridge's book "The !tty Twit'; is a series of dialogues 
between the author and Mr. !tty Twit to illustrate general semantic 
principles. 
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designated. That is, if one cannot describe it in terms of observable 
details, differences, etc. Korzybski says some of the most important 
terms we have must be considered as multiordinal terms. Words such as 
"yes," "no," "true," "false," "function," "relation," "fact," "reali-
ty," etc., are such that they can be applied to a statement about a 
statement about the first statement no matter what their order of ab-
straction is. 11 Consider Mr. !tty Twit's use of "liberty." 
Mr. !tty Twit defines "liberty" as something he looses when hand-
cuffs are put on his wrists something our forefathers fought for, 
something Abraham Lincoln said in "This nation conceived in 'liberty, '" 
and something he has loved all his life. What Mr. Itty Twit is opera-
tionalizing is that "liberty" means what~ver he wants it to mean at 
the time; but, insisting all along that "everyone knows what liberty 
is!" 
The main characteristic of multiordinal words is that on differ-
ent levels or orders of abstractions they have different meanings, 
with the result that they have no general meanings. Their meanings, 
then, are determined solely by the given context, which establishes 
the different orders of abstraction. Consider the following dialogue: 
I: "Do you love me?" 
II: "Yes, I do." 
I: "Will you do anything for me?" 
II: "Yes, of course I will." 
I: "Then drink this bottle of arsenic to prove your love." 
Absurd? Perhaps and perhaps not. "Yes," "love," and "anything" 
mean different things to different people in that they are multiordi-
nal words with no general meaning. 
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In reality, these words represent "yes," "love," and "anything" 
UNLIMITED, but this INCLUDES "yes"1 , "yes 11 2 , "yes 11 3 ; "love"1 , "love'\, 
"love11 3 ; and "anything''i, "anything"2, "anything"3, etc., all of which 
are, or may be different. It would be wise for us to realize the 
different levels of meaning least we find ourselves being poisoned by 
words. 
One of the most "colorful" examples of a multiordinal argument 
the author has witnessed to date occurred one evening when three stu-
dents and the author were engaged in a discussion about "what is art?" 
One of the students, an art major, kept insisting that no one could 
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know art when he saw it unless he had been trained to know what art 
was. Two other students, philosophy majors, were attacking art from 
various so-called philosophical aspects (which to this date, the au-
thor does not understand). The author said absolutely nothing u11til 
confronted by the art major who said, "Why haven't you said anything? 
What do you think art is? 
"I don't understand what you are talking about. What do you mean 
by art?" the author replied. The art student said, "Man, what a cop 
out. You never have anything to say about anything important. We've 
only been talking about it for an hour and if you don't know by now, 
you never will." 
Besides the obvious allness statements (never, anything) and 
identification (cop out=nothing to say), the art major was not recog-
nizing the different levels, multiordinality, of the word "art." It 
is very difficult, if not impossible, to reach agreement on multi-
ordinal concepts, if the referents for those things are not defined so 
each person has some idea of the meanings of symbols used and on what 
level of abstraction they are used. 
As Korzybski says: 
The main point about all such multiordinal terms is that 
all arguments about them, "in general," lead only to 
identification of orders of abstraction and semantic 
disturbances and nowhere else. Multiordinal terms have 
only definite meanings on a given level and in a given 
context. Before we can argue about them, we must fix 
their orders, whereupon the issues become simple and 
lead to agreement.12 
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Perhaps one answer to "what is art?" could have been that art is 
the symbol of symbols. It expresses everything because it expresses 
nothing. 
No doubt you have noticed in reading this manuscript the multi-
ordinal word REALITY has been underlined. This is to emphasize the 
word in the particular context it is used. In effect, the author is 
saying "please, don't take this word for granted, but consider it in 
the context of its usage which indicates how you are to apply it." 
Multiordinal words can hardly be avoided. (It is not suggested 
that they should be done away with). But, the awareness of the self-
reflexive character of the language and the potential ensuing multi-
ordinal words can keep us from entertaining self-reflexiveness gone 
wild, and the host of rumors, gossip, and nonsensical conversations 
which can result. 
Desire for Certainty 
In instances of identification of the levels of abstraction, all-
ness statements, unchecked self-reflexiveness and unconscious projec-
tion, the principle of probability or uncertainty is largely ignored. 
This principle, Johnson say~, simply states that 1) truth is 
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tentative because all things change 2) truth is tentative because it 
is abstracted by human beings who are not infallible, and 3) predic-
tions can be made and reports can be given only with some degree of 
probability, not with absolute certainty. In other words, and blunt-
ly, one cannot be ABSOLUTELY CERTAIN of anything--except, it would 
seem, uncertainty. 13 
The importance of relating language structure to non-verbal 
reality has been stressed. The probability principle, Johnson says, 
lies in the fact that our living reactions and experiences are on the 
low, nonverbal levels of abstraction. On higher verbal levels, we can 
say they do not. As Hayakawa expressed, we can put up a sign which 
says "Free Beer Here," when no free beer exists. 14 Another example 
can be shown when, during the course of a lecture, a student raised 
her hand and said, "You can't say that." The professor's response 
was, "I can say anything I want to." 
As Heraclitus said, you cannot step into the same river twice. 
All things change, and nothing is the same twice. And because no two 
things are the same twice, one's inability to adjust to reality will 
be in proportion to the degree to which he insists on certainty as to 
facts, and believes that he has achieved certainty, finally, forever, 
that's all. 
If the principle of probability is followed, we would not react 
to something or someone in the ~ manner twice. He would delay, 
differentiate and not behave as if a certain thing or person belonged 
to a specific class of things and was to be treated as all things are 
treated in that class. A college, sophomore football player describes 
the following: 
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"It's funny, I guess. People think just because you play foot .. 
ball you are stupid or illiterate, like an animal. They think the 
only thing you can do is bash into people and growl on the field. So 
you know, it always surprises them when you talk and sound half-way 
intelligent. And you know, since I'~ black, most people asswne I'm 
stupid. You know, all niggers are." 
As Johnson expresses it: 
We make such blunders by reacting t~ the individual not 
as though he were an individual, different and variable, 
but as though he were merely a member of a type and the 
same as all other members of that type--and then we react 
inappropriately because we are so very sure of our 
opinion of the type.15 
The person who expresses a fear of uncertainty, or complains of 
"things changing so fast, 11 is one who more often than not will cherish 
his truth with a capital T and insist, in allness terms, that there is 
nothing more to the situation. The person who is unaware of projec-
tion--that his observations are an extension of himself, as well as 
his observable world, will ignore the fact that truth is tentative and 
his truth may be a non-truth for others. Unchecked self-reflexiveness 
allows the Aristotelian to formulate answers to his metaphysical ques-
tions by making statements about statements which may not be tied to 
observable reality. He will find the answer one way or the other. 
The attitude of "I don't know, let's see," is foreign to the per-
son not aware of the probability principle. He will respond in a sim-
ilar fashion to any situation or event. The scientifically oriented 
person will not consider words as the facts they supposedly represent. 
He will check the territory himself or attempt, through questioning 
others, to get closer to observable reality. 
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Profile of Close-Mindedness 
The Aristotelian or common sense approach to problem coping lends 
itself to close-mindedness--an unwillingness to accept or consider 
others' ideas and/or evidence which might seem contrary to existing 
beliefs and/or opinions. Johnson says the Aristotelian tends to be 
characterized by rigidity, and places a high valuation on tradition 
and on Authority with a capital A. 
The rigid personality, which favors obedience and submission to 
authority is further discussed by James Martin, as the prejudiced and 
intolerant personality. He notes several characteristics which are 
similar to the Aristotelian: The rigid personality prefers dogmatism 
to doubt--relativistic thinking does not satisfy his intellectual 
appetite (A is A); the strongly prejudiced person favors obedience and 
submission to authority, a trait congruent with his zeal for defini-
tiveness (does not like uncertainty or change); he appears to be low 
on creativeness, humanitarianism and compassion, and he is inclined to 
be fatalistic and pessimistic about the scientific study of human be-
havior (rejection of controlled, systematic observation); he makes 
strong distinctions between his in-groups and out-groups (either you 
are with me or you are not; if you agree with me, you are a good guy; 
if you don't you are a bad guy); he views the world as an arena of 
conflict, involving power struggles and competition among individuals 
and groups (failure to see differences among things, events, people, 
etc., classifying and drawing relations without adequate first-order 
observations). And cognitively, the strongly prejudiced person seeks 
certainty through the use of dichotomized absolutes (law of non-
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contradiction, something cannot be both A and non-A). 16 
The intolerant and prejudiced personality is not anxious, then to 
change or revise his beliefs. He sees the world in absolutes, makes 
definite distinctions between those people he identifies with and 
those he doesn't (and won't listen to). This individual might show 
his true colors in the kinds and number of questions he asks. Does he 
ask questions to seek information? Or does he ask questions to rein-
force his beliefs? Or does he ask questions at all? 
It was mentioned earlier that the asking of CLEAR and MEANINGFUL 
questions to direct one's observations is the primary step in the 
scientific approach. Questioning of our beliefs and seeking informa-
tion about others' beliefs is also a part of EMPATHIC listening and 
understanding. Korzybski and Johnson have proposed EXTEN$IONAL DEVICES 
which remind one of the relationship between language and reality_ so 
that connnunication can be more clear and meaningful. Questions, em-
pathic listening and understanding, extensional devices and clear and 
meaningful communication all contribute to the PREVENTION of communi-
cation breakdown and help group discussions from becoming DISINTEGRA-
TIVE. Each of these elements will be discussed in light of how, if 
consciously used and understood disintegrative patterns in communica-
tion can be avoided. 
Facilitatir1cg Communication 
Perhaps the most distinquishing feature between the scientifically 
oriented person and the Aristotelian is the manner in which questions 
are asked and the number of questions asked. There are some individu-
als who never or rarely ask a question. It does not occur to them 
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that their infonnation might be incomplete. Johnson mentions that the 
person who asks few questions also shows little hesitancy in answering 
questions asked by other, or in offering opinions on whatever is be-
17 ing discussed. Those who display what Johnson calls a sort-of ver-
bal brillance also exhibit a remarkable lack of self-criticism, which 
is essential in the process of re-examining verbal maps. The Aristo-
telian loves his beliefs, partially because they are HIS beliefs and 
does not want to change them. 
Questions 
The scientist, Johnson says, realizes that beliefs automatically 
become questions the moment he realizes that they ARE beliefs instead 
of facts. 18 Johnson illustrates the point: When we say, "Criminal 
behavior is hereditary," and realize that we have stated an hypothe-
sis, a mere belief, it is actually as if we had said, "Is criminal 
behavior hereditary?" If we are very clear about our abstraction 
processes, we would go on to ask, "Under what conditions does criminal 
behavior occur?" and "To what, first of all, do the terms criminal 
behavior and heredity refer?"l9 
The scientist's theories and explanations are made possible 
through formulation of questions which direct observations. Then 
differences that make a difference can be observed, similarities drawn, 
relations examined and theories made. It is not just enough, to ASK 
questions. The assumptions behind them clearly must be recognized as 
OURS--they may not be universally accepted or valid. Johnson 
explains: 
To be aware that our beliefs are abstractions is to be 
aware that they were abstracted by us :f;rom some lower-
order abstractions, and these in turn from abstractions 
of still lower order, etc. Eventually, then, we are 
brought back to reality, to the non-verbal levels of 
experience and observation.20 
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The import of asking questions is to guide us to checking our beliefs 
and assumptions--our higher order abstractions-~with experience and 
observation. 
It is a cardinal rule in the meaningful use of language that the 
terminology of the question determines the terminology of the answer. 
One cannot get a clear answer to a vague question. 21 Johnson further 
states that an answerable question will indicate WHICH parts of the 
territory and when we are referring to. Consider the following 
dialogue: 
I: "Have you ever thought about the relevancy of your exist-
ence?" 
II: "No." 
I: "Don't you think you should?" 
II: "What do you mean by the 'relevancy of my existence?'" 
I: "Just that your life is meaningless when you die. No one 
knows you lived, therefore what good does it do to live?" 
II: "I suppose it might have something to do with how you define 
living." 
I: "How do you know you are alive? How do you know you are not 
dreaming and that I am a dream and the blackboard is a dream and your 
typewriter is a dream and everything is a dream?" 
II: "That is something I couldn't care less about. Basically, 
because I have no way of knowing." 
I: "If you have no way of knowing, then how can you justify your 
existence?" 
II: "Tell me something, do you spend much time thinking about 
these things?" 
I: "All the time. Every night, Because these are the only im-
portant questions we must find answers for." 
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Indeed, the metaphysical questions are important for the Aristo-
telian. It may become a rather sad state of affairs, when one begins 
losing sleep over such unanswerable questions. 
Why unanswerable? First, WHERE do we look in the territory for 
"relevancy of our existence," "meaningfulness (life) after death," 
and "everything is a dream?" How, for instance, would we ·recognize 
"relevancy?" Does it have legs? Can it speak? Will we find it run-
ning down the street? 
Second, WHEN do we search? Last week, last year, tomorrow? 
Subject A seems to be looking for the ONE answer, the final 
absolute answer which will enable him to sleep better at night. He 
it1.dicates some observable first-order facts--typewriter, blackboard, 
you, me--but to assume these things are, or are not, a dream is to 
make an inference which cannot be tied to observable reality. He 
seemingly is unconscious that his abstractions are unique and private 
and not necessarily valid. Subject A seems to be asking for reinforce-
ment of his belief that these questions are important; he is not 
concerned with the critical examination of his beliefs or with the 
seeking of a~ditional information which might bring a change in his 
assumptions. 
Some of the confusion of the levels of abstr~ction and failure to 
relate map to territory. in the above dialogue have been discussed, but 
the fact remains that some questions are simply UNANSWERABLE. As 
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suggested by Lee, there is scarcely any other notion more liberating, 
more conducive to clearheadedness than the notion that some questions 
are unanswerable. 
Lee suggests that it is not a matter of our not having the infor-
mation or the intelligence to answer them. It is simply that the 
questions do not imply just what particular information is required. 
No amount of intelligence can overcome this. In fact, 
anyone who unhesitantly and confidently answers such 
questions, or who persistently tries to answer them 
exhibits thereby a profound lack of intelligence. 22 
In summary, it would seem the person who clings to his beliefs 
because they are HIS beliefs and something to be cherished and not 
examined, is the person who asks few questions. The ones he does ask 
often are unanswerable. This person is unaware of the orderly process 
. ' 
of abstraction, lives and believes on high levels of inference, ac-· 
cepts his assumptions uncritically, and is what the author would call 
a "lover of words." (And it can be pretty embarrassing to find one-
self loving a word.) 
Johnson makes a distinction between the scientifically oriented 
person who is conscious of abstracting and the Aristotelian in the 
matter of glibness. He says the former tends not to be glib. The 
latter tends to be very glib. 
They can rattle along at a great rate about neurotics 
and dropouts and Communists. They don't seem to recognize 
that there are any basic questions of meaning to be asked. 
To them a word is a word, and that's all there is to 
it--to say it, is to make it so.23 
As Johnson very aptly put it, fool is one who knows all the an-
24 
swers but none of the questions. The intolerant personality--the 
individual who asks few questions but has many answers--may fall into 
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the category of "glibness." 
Questioning of our beliefs and the beliefs of others can be con-
sidered an important tool in facilitating communication. Lee notes 
that much of the breakdown in group discussions coincides with failure 
of participants to understand each other and WHEN participants under-
stand each other. On very high levels of abstraction or inference, we 
can heartily agree--or understand each other--but what we agree about 
may mean very different things to each person on different levels of 
abstraction. Most often, when we do not understand each other, it is 
because we make evaluative judgments on what has been said, rather 
than trying to achieve the speaker's frame of reference. 
Empathic Communication 
Carl Rogers states that major barriers to mutual interpersonal 
communication arise from this tendency to judge, to evaluate, to ap-
prove or dissapprove others' statements. 25 
tion: 
Consider the following dialogue from the standpoint of evalua-
''You treat me like a child. 11 
"That's ridiculous. I do not. 11 
"But, I feel you treat me as if you were my father rather than my 
husband." 
"That's illogical and stupid and you ought to know better." 
This discussion, which eventually ended in a tearful, shouting 
contest could have been diverted if subjects would have used what 
Rogers calls "listening with understanding." This, according to 
Rogers, is an attempt to sree the expressed idea and attitude from the 
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other person's point of view, to sense how it feels to him, to achieve 
HIS frame of reference to the non-verbal phenomena. This type of lis-
tening, Rogers calls empathic listening, or understanding WITH .a 
person, not ABOUT him. 26 
To achieve this type listening or understanding, Rogers suggests 
that we should, in our own words, restate the ideas expressed, to the 
satisfaction of the speaker. This would mean that, as nearly as pos-
sible, we would have to achieve the other speaker's frame of reference 
--to understand his thoughts and feelings so well that we could 
summarize them to his satisfaction. 27 Once a person's point of view 
has been verbalized, our owri beliefs, attitudes, etc., may be revised. 
The discussion becomes less emotional: differences are reduced, and 
the differences remaining will be understood and more tolerable. 
This empathic listening can be compared with "backing down the 
abstraction ladder" in an attempt to get closer to the experiential or 
observable leveis ••• where events are felt, seen, heard, etc. 
Questioning would seem to play an important part in this attempt 
to share referents for non-verbal events. Through the questioning of 
others' Eltatements, ("What do you mean?" How do you know?" "Is this 
what you are saying?" "Do I understand you correctly to say?" etc.) 
one can get to the lower levels of abstraction and facilitate shared 
meanings with others as well as the revising of ones opinions and 
attitudes. 
In speaking meaningfully one does not just connnunicate; 
one communicates something to someone. And the something 
communicatf!d is not th~ 8words that are used, but whatever 
those words represent. 
The clarity of the language employed is a measure of the degree 
46 
to which words represent the same thing for the speaker that they do 
for the listener. Clarity is a prerequisite for validity. Statements 
may be clear without having validity, but if they are unclear, their 
validity cannot be determined. The extensional devices and terms may 
be used to help both speaker and listener share meanings or experience 
for symbols (words) used. Johnson says: 
Only to the extent that those who hear a statement agree 
as to the specific conditions or observations required for 
ascertaining its validity can the question of its validity 
have meaning. And the extent to which they do agree in 
this sense, is of course, an indicatio.n of the extent to 
which the statement is clear or meaningful. If a statement 
is such that those who hear it do not agree at all as to 
how it might be verified or ref~ted, the statement may be 
"beautiful" or "eloquent," or grammatica!gY irreproachable. 
But it is also, and above all, nonsense. 
In this process of sharing meanings, or relating symbols to real-
~ Johnson and Korzybski offer extensional devices to help remind one 
of the structural relationship between language and observable reali-
EX.· 
Extensional Devices and Terms 
The extensional devices and terms remind one of, 1) the differ-
ence between seemingly similar things, 2) that all things change and 
no two things are the same twice, 3) that there is always more to be 
said about anything, 4) that many things cannot be split.verbally 
because those things do not exist independently of each other in real-
~, 5) that o~r obsetvations are a joint product of our nervous 
system and what is observed and 6) of the false-to-fact relationship 
of one cause-one effect. 
The extensional devices (see page 65) remind us of the self-
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corrective potential of abstractio.n and combat elementalism, identifi-
cation, either-orishness, allness, and unconscious projection. 
Clear and Meaningful Conununication 
In this project, the extensional devices and terms were used as 
a partial measure for clear and meaningful communication, which goes 
hand-in-hand with the extensional orientation and scientific orienta-
tion. 
Clear and meaningful communication here refers to the degree that 
statements and questions refer directly or indirectly to something in 
the realm of experience. As Johnson says, it is not enough that 
statements refer to something for the speaker and something for the 
listener; what .is required is that they refer to approximately the 
same thing for both speaker and listener. He adds: Ideally, if per-
sons are speaking with clarity and meaningfulness; if they are sharing 
non-verbal referents for symbols used and each understands and agrees 
on the referents, there should be no signal reactions in ~ommunication 
dialogues. The signal reaction, which is an undelayed response to a 
word, statement, etc., and a reaction to the word rather than what 
that word symbolizes, was identified each time a person INTERRUPTED 
another before he had finished speaking. The signal reaction signi-
fies a lack of empathic listening and may be associated with/or lead 
to disintegrative patterns in the discussion. 
Disintegrative Patterns 
The use of empathic listening and the questioning that is a part 
of this kind of understanding, and the conscious use of extensional 
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devices can help combat signal reactions and what Irving Lee class!-
fies as disintegrative patterns. 
Lee says the tendency for discussions to become disintegrative 
most often occurs when differences of opinion are expressed,* and when 
the controversy and/or conflicts signalize a loss of rapport, so that, 
participants seem to be talking AT, OR PAST, rather than WITH each 
other. 
Lee's six disintegrative patterns are: 1) when the argument 
moves from the issue to the personalities; 2) when colloquy between 
factions is marked by such ego-statements as "You're absolutely 
wrong," "I've had years of experience in this," "I know what I am 
talking about," etc.; 3) when a speaker identifies himself so thor-
oughly with an issue that criticism of it is construed as an attack on 
him; 4) when one participant fails to deal with a question or argu-
ment raised by another who continues to call attention to the failure; 
5) when inaccuracy or falsification is charged, and 6) when there 
are discrepancies in assertions of THE facts, etc.JO The disintegra-
tive patterns indicate a lack of understanding of the relationship of 
language to reality. They signify evaluations on TERMS rather than 
MEANINGS and VALUES assigned to terms by human nervous systems; con-
fusion of levels of abstraction; confusion of statements of fact with 
inferences; unconscious projection and a desire for certainty charac-
teristic of the A is A orientation. 
Disintegrative patterns, where people are talking AT rather than 
*This does not mean that ALL arguments are disfunctional or dis-
integrative. As Lee notes, many times it is through the discussion of 
differences of opinion that solutions are worked out and ideas clari-
fied. 
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WITH each other can be avoided. Lee notes that progress in the areas 
of understanding does NOT require a correction or simplification of 
the language or the creation of special abridgments. Rather, he says, 
progress depends on a re-orientation of attitudes toward the verbal-
izing process itself. 
This re-orientation is central to the discipline of general 
semantics and is parallel to the extensional orientation. This exten-
sional orientation centers on applying techniques and practices of 
general semantics as outlined in the processes of abstracting. The 
extensional orientation is what Johnson describes as the scientific 
method. It is the process of abstracting carried on consciously and 
adequately and it involves keeping the levels of abstraction distinct 
and coordinated. It means maintaining adequate word-fact relation-
ships or relationships between inference and non-verbal facts and 
abstracting in the proper order from lower to higher levels and back 
again in a self-corrective manner. 
Extensionalization can be displayed and/or observed through 
actions and/or behavior. One can get an idea of an individual's 
extensionalization (or lack of it) by observing language behavior, in 
that words used and the structure of statements, give us an idea to 
what degree one is relating map to territory. 
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS 
This project attempts to see to what degree students are exten-
sionalizing general semantic principles by analyzing clear and meaning-
ful conmunication (sharing referents for symbols and/or relating the 
"map" to the "territory") and to examine disintegrative patterns in 
group discussions. 
Thus far, the Aristotelian orientation has been discussed in terms 
of the A is A laws. It has been noted that the Aristotelian shares 
certain commonalities with the close-minded, intolerant person, who 
most often is unwilling to change his beliefs, rarely asks questions 
and often makes glib and verbose statements about whatever is being 
discussed. 
The scientific orientation has been explained in relation to keep-
ing verbal maps coordinated with non-verbal realities. The extensional 
devices, the self-corrective processes of the concept of empathic 
understanding and asking questions have been offered as ways to facili-
tate communication and avoid disintegrative patterns. 
Objectives Restated 
The overall purpose of this study was to determine to what degree 
students were extensionalizing language behavior. Three anal major 
analyses were performed: 
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1. Examination of the number and kind of questions asked, 
2. Examination of the frequency of clear and meaningful indices 
as defined by the extensional devices and techniques, and 
3. Examination of signal reactions in relationship to disintegra-
tive patterns. 
Subjects were students enrolled in a general semantics class at 
Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma during the spring semes-
ter of 1973. As a requirement for the course, students were asked to 
form groups of three and present a panel discussion on some topic of 
their choice. Instructions for the discussion, taken from the class 
syllabus were: 
A series of three-member Feedback Panels are set up to 
discuss conunon problems that lend themselves to eliciting 
widely varying opinions. 
The attached problem statements are portrayed in the 
abstract--somewhat as they often are in the mass media 
and in daily conversations. (These topics are offered 
as examples. No doubt, you will think of others.) 
Please get together with two other persons and choose a 
topic by Friday, January 19. 
Format of the Feedback Panel discussions is outlined as 
follows: 
a) Panel members research and discuss various aspects 
of the issue from the standpoint of general semantics or 
similar frame: i.e. the language, Aristotelian orienta-
tion, levels of abstraction, process "reality," structure 
of maps compared with territories, etc. You might divide 
your intended remarks into several different approaches 
and share the responsibilities. 
b) Members of the class are asked to initi.ate discussion 
by questioning the panel--questions concerning their 
opinions and/or curiosity about the issue •. Or, they 
might; ask about the "facts" surrounding the issue. Or, 
they may cite instances they have experienced or observed 
that centered on the issue. The major interest in these 
presentations profitably could be in the analysis of 
evidence of Aristotelian orientations that affect us all. 
Panels carry Oto 300 points. 
All of the nine panel discussions were tape recorded and three were 
selected for analysis. Among those were the first and last panel of 
the semester, selected for comparison over time. 
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In the meaningful use of language it is a cardinal rule that the 
terminology of the question determines the terminology of the answer. 
One cannot get a clear answer to a vague question. The scientific 
method as manifested through language behavior begins with asking clear 
and meaningful questions in order to direct one's observations. Asking 
questions seems essential in adequate communication, if we are to 
attempt to share referents for non-verbal phenomena. In other words, 
we must question our own beliefs and ask questions of others' state-
ments which will lead us to the observations necessary to understand 
those beliefs/statements. 
Questions were then examined from the standpoint of unanswerable 
and answerable questions. The former is the vague, meaningless ques-
tion because it does not imply just what particular information may be 
required to answer it. For example, the question, "Do you think a 
liberal believes in change for change's sake?" is an unanswerable ques-
tion. Where would one go to find a liberal and how would one know 
change for change's sake? There can be (and was) considerable discus-
sion on this question which will lead nowhere except into other areas of 
unanswerable questions. 
An answerable question is one stated precisely so the means of 
answering it are clearly indicated. The specific observations needed 
and the conditions under which they are to be made are implied in the 
question itself. The way to avoid unanswerable questions is to indicate 
where and when one may reasonably expect to find answers. In 
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distinquishing unanswerable from answerable questions the following 
question was asked of each person's question: "By exactly what proce-
dures might a reliable factual answer to it be found?" If the question 
did not indicate which parts of the territory and when observations 
were to be made it was classified as an unanswerable question. 
Nwnber of Questions Asked 
The number of statements and questions asked were counted. In all 
panels, subjects spoke 876 times. Only 167 of these utterances were 
questions. By comparing the first panel of the semester with the last, 
fewer questions were asked in the latter than the former. This might 
indicate that, even through taking the class, students had not learned 
the importance of asking questions in relating verbal maps with non-
verbal territories. Simple chi square tests were used to test each 
panel's number of statements against the number of questions. Table I, 
page 56, shows that for all panels and the grand total, chi squares 
were significant at the .001 level. We would expect these results to 
occur by chance one in 1,000 times--a highly significant result. 
Students in all panel discussions seemed to be more eager to make 
statements, exert opinions, give answers, etc., than to ask questions. 
In attempting to explain the lack of questions, one might ask 
first, what the panels' subjects were. A summary statement of discus-
sion leader's topics (by the author) is as follows: 
Panel I: The dangers of labeling. 
Panel II: What is learning? 
Panel III: A discussion on the panel discussions. 
Panel I 
Panel II 
Panel III 
Total 
TABLE I 
NUMBER OF QUESTIONS AND STATEMENTS AND SIGNIFICANCE 
LEVELS FOR PANEL DISCUSSIONS 
Questions Statements p 
68 220 P< .001 
69 335 P< .001 
30 154 P< .001 
167 709 P< .001 
Total 
288 
404 
184 
876 
All topics seem broad enough to elicit a wide range of opinions 
and all panel discussions lasted until the class period (50 minutes) 
ended. It is immediately apparent, however, that Panel II had far 
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more total verbalisms than the other two panels. This may be a direct 
result of the method of counting statements and questions. Each time 
a person spoke, it was counted. When a person was interrupted by 
another before be bad finished completing his statement the remark was 
counted as one statement. The person who interrupted was credited with 
one--even if the interruption was only one or two words. These inter.,.. 
ruptions, called signal reactions and shown in Table II, might help 
explain why panel II has a larger total. The larger n\Dllber of total 
statements is partially due to the fact that many statements, because 
of interruptions were shorter--there were more to be counted. Another 
reason, and perhaps a more important one, is that 201 of the total 404 
verbalisms were spoken by subject Be and many of the interruptions were 
from other students attempting to voice their opinions. (The 201 
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occurrences do not include the number of times this subject was speak-
ing at the same time others were speaking). 
TABLE II 
SIGNAL REACTIONS COMPARED WITH QUESTIONS AND 
STATEMENTS IN EACH OF THE PANEL DISCUSSIONS 
Signal Reactions Questions Statements Total 
Panel I 36 68 220 288 
Panel II 155 69 335 404 
Panel III 67 30 154 184 
The amount of questions ASKED in comparison to statements MADE can 
be one way to guage the extent one is attempting to share referents or 
relate maps to the territories. The individual who asks few questions 
may be the one who doesn't stop to consider that his beliefs, atti-
tudes, etc., may need revising--that his information is out-dated or 
inadequate. Note, in Table III, page 58, subjects Be and D, seem quite 
glib and verbose but ask few questions in relation to the number of 
statements made. In all cases except Rs and G, students verbalized 
twice as many (or more) statements as they did questions. A Spearman 
rank order correlation coefficient of .73 wa, significant at the .01 
level, further supporting the notion that overall, as students make 
fewer statements they also ask fewer questions. The difference between 
the scores is high, however, with Be and J making 12 times as many 
statements as questions they asked. 
It was indicated that the close-minded person asks few questions 
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and gives many "answers" or seems very glib and verbose. Be and J, 
and to a great extent, D and B display this kind of language behavior. 
It is also noteworthy that Be had 63 signal reactions, (interrupted a 
person before he had finished speaking), D had 46 and J had 20. One 
might suspect that these three subjects are high in Aristotelianism and 
low in both empathic listening and self-corrective abstracting aided 
by the use of questions. 
TABLE III 
TOTAL NUMBER OF STATEMENTS AND QUESTIONS 
BY EACH PANEL MEMBER 
Persons Statements Questions 
Be 287 24 
D 73 21 
B 54 13 
J 49 4 
A 44 21 
N 34 5 
E 15 5 
T 14 3 
p 14 0 
R 13 3 
Br 9 3 
K 7 3 
Rs 5 5 
G 2 2 
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Answerable and Unanswerable Questions 
Of the questions asked, three categories were isolated; 1) an-
swerable questions, 2) unanswerable questions and 3) non-issue ques-
tions. (non-issue included questions such as "Pardon me?" "Question 
over there?" "What did you say?" or similar questions. They were not 
included in the analysis since they were of low profile regarding 
specific information on an issue. 
The unanswerable questions (vague, ambiguous, nonsensical) far 
outnlDllbered the answerable ones (indicating from which parts of the 
territory and when observations are to be, or were, made. A question 
is no more than a series of puffs of air, if the means for finding 
possible answers are not clearly indicated within the question. 
In this analysis, only five of the 167 questions filled the 
criteria for answerable questions. Out of the total 876 questions and 
statements, five answerable questions would be one-half of one percent 
of the total. For asking clear and meaningful questions to direct 
observations and revise beliefs, class members were "drastically" low. 
Table IV lists the five questions, who asked them, and subjects' 
number of total statements and questions. 
Notice that three of the answerable questions came from individu-
als who did not speak as often as others. (Subjects K, Rand Br) 
Also note that Be, out of 24 questions had only one classified as an-
swerable and subject A had one answerable question out of 21. Be's 
question is simple and directly asks for an explanation of an observ-
able behavior. On the other hand, K's question asks for observable 
referents for classifications. While K seems to be backing down the 
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abstraction ladder and seeking information to describe higher level 
inferences, Be is moving up the ladder and seeking information about a 
non-verbal action. While both questions display a conscious use of 
the processes of abstracting, K's question seeks a description while 
Be's seeks an explanation. 
Subjects Kand Br, who each had one answerable question out of 
three questions asked, had two and one signal reactions for all panels 
respectively. This may indicate that persons who have fewer signal 
reactions and fewer overall statements ask more questions in relation-
ship to the number of statements they make and those questions tend 
more often to be answerable questions. 
TABLE IV 
FIVE ANSWERABLE QUESTIONS, COMPARED WITH TOTAL 
QUESTIONS AND STATEMENTS UTTERED BY EACH 
OF FIVE PARTICIPANTS 
Subject Answerable Question 
Total 
Questions 
K: What kind of first-level observations are 3 
you basing these categories on, and the 
labels you are putting on people? 
Br: What is your definition of a liberal? 3 
R: Well, where did you get this information 3 
that you are disseminating right now? 
A: What I am asking is, is you know, what 21 
are you basing the facts on, that a person 
to be liberal must have to be well travel~d? 
Be: Why are you shaking your head? 24 
Total 
Statements 
7 
9 
13 
44 
287 
Table V shows the total numbers of answerable and unanswerable 
questions for each panel. 
TABLF! V 
NUMBER OF ANSWERABLE AND UNANSWERABLE 
QUESTIONS FOR EACH PANEL 
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Answerable Unanswerable Total 
Panel I 2 47 49 
Panel II 3 46 49 
Panel III 0 18 18 
Total 5 111 116 
The number of answerable questions is negligible and it is inter-
esting to note that far less questions were asked on Panel III than 
Panels II or I. It is noteworthy that in this discussion almost one 
third of all statements were interrupted. (See Table II) It seemed 
to be perhaps the most hostile and/or heated discussion of the three. 
Subject D, a panel discussion leader, expressed his dislike for the 
general semantics class by suggesting that a cure for the panel dis-
cussions might be to do away with the panels or do away with the 
class, and that the course certainly wasn't worth $14. 
Several times during this discussion, people were talking simul-
taneously. Class members were for the most part supporting the idea 
of panel discussions while the panel leaders steadfastly maintained 
the panels were worthless and often discounted other's opinions as 
"you don't understand," or "that is not important to the discussion." 
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It was a highly charged, emotional discussion and, as Rogers says, it 
is most difficult to listen empathetically (or question others to 
attempt to see something from their point of view) when emotions run 
high. 
Questions to Seek Information and to Reinforce Beliefs 
Some questions are asked to seek information, others to seek re-
inforcement of beliefs. A question which attempts to solicit informa-
tion about what the speaker is referring to, what thing or event, that 
can be seen, heard, smelled, tasted, felt, or somehow directly known, 
(neurally or extraneurally) is counted as a question to seek informa-
tion. Questions which ask "What do you mean?" or "Do I understand 
correctly?" or other questions which attempt to restate what has been 
verbalized are questions classified as seeking information. 
Questions which seek reinforcement of beliefs are recognized most 
easily because they are simply declarative statements in a question 
format. "Do you mean to tell me that you really believe ••• ?" would be 
an example. The forced choice question is also classified as a rein-
forcement of beliefs. It is one which gives the respondent only two 
alternatives. "Do you think learning is beneficial or not?" would be 
an example. 
A leading question is one which indicates the response desired, 
such as, "Don't you think education on this campus is a farce?" Ques-
tions which fall into the non-issue category are those which facili-
tate the discussion such as "Question over there? or·"Pardon me?" or 
some other question which in essence neither seeks information nor 
reinforcement of beliefs. 
63 
A question may be both answerable and to reinforce beliefs. This 
is illustrated with A's question (See Table IV). He is asking for re-
ferents for "liberal" and "well-traveled," but alone, these things can 
not be observed in non-verbal reality; thus, the question is classi-
fied as one to reinforce beliefs. Table VI shows reinforcing and 
seeking questions for all panels. 
TABLE VI 
QUESTIONS ACROSS ALL PANELS, SHOWING CATEGORIES.OF 
SEEKING INFORMATION AND REINFORCING BELIEFS FOR 
ANSWERABLE AND UNANSWERABLE QUESTIONS 
Questions 
Answerable Unanswerable 
Seek Reinforce Seek Reinforce 
Information Beliefs Information Beliefs Total 
Panel I 1 1 6 41 49 
Panel II 3 0 12 34 49 
Total 4 1 21 90 
An example of an unanswerable question to reinforce beliefs is: 
Be: "Now can you tell me, from what you have done and from the 
few remarks you have made, do you think this is a state of mind or 
reality?" The most appropriate answer to this perhaps melodious-
sounding, but nonsensical, question might be "I have no idea." The 
question is UNANSWERABLE because no observable referents exist for 
"reality" and "state of mind." Also, only twp alternatives are pre-
sented, classifying this question as a forced choice question. 
The following is an example of an unanswerable question classified 
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as ••eking information. 
A: "Okay, what wu it what was it you wanted out of the panels?" 
It is unanswerable again for the .!.!!!!.'reasons given in the example 
above, It was classified as SEEKING INFORMATION becauae it attempted 
to gain information on lower levels of abstraction-"what was it you 
wanted"--and information obtained potentially could have been related 
to or directly explained by observable sense data. 
More REINFORCING than SEEKING questions were asked, indicating an 
Aristotelian orientation of subjects. Th.e UNANSWERABLE-REINFORCEMENT 
category drew far more entries than any other. This would seem to 
indicate that subjects were more anxious to have others agree to, or 
reinforce, their beliefs. They seem to be less concerned with ASKING 
QUESTIONS of others' to revise their beliefs or attempt empathic 
understanding. They seem to be content with existing opinions and re-
luctant to consider "differences which might make a difference" in 
their evaluations. 
In analyzing statements an attempt WE1s made to determine how 
often subjects were relating maps to the territories in their language 
behavior. Johnson and Korzybski's extensional devices were used as 
indices of clear and meaningful communication. If consciously employ-
.ed they help remind us 1) of the relationship of map and territory, 
2) that language is static and reality dynamic, 3) to limit our 
generalizations to more specific statements 4) that our language is a 
product of what is observed and our observations of it, 5) that 
language is man-made and only as effective as its users, and 6) that 
there is always more to be said, etc. The purpose in employing exten-
sional devices is to make language more precise, more clear and 
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meaningful and thusly facilitate understanding and agreement, elements 
desirable, if not necessary in meaningful group communications. The 
extensional devices are: 
1. Indexes: Indication of differences between things: i.e. 
learning1 is not learning2, conservative1 is not conservative2• 
2. Dates: Indication of indexing time: i.e. Frank yesterday is 
not Frank today, Classes this semester are not classes last semester• 
3. Etc: The use of the term etc., indicating there is~ to 
say. 
4. Plurals: Indicating that there are more than~ "things," 
i.e., cause!!., effect!!., reason!!., objective!!.· 
5. Operational Terms: Indication of descriptions of actions 
performed. Indicating which parts of the territory must be examined 
to describe the actions involved in observations made. 
6. Quantifying Terms: Terms which specify exact numerical 
values, i.e., 236 students rather than many or lots, etc. 
7. Qualifying Terms: Terms which serve to qualify, to state 
exceptions and specify conditions, i.e., except, but, under conditions 
of. 
8. Consciousness of Projection~ Indication that subjects 
recognized their statements are a product of observer and observed. 
Words which indicate to-me-ness, i.e., as I see it, to me, I believe, 
from my point of view, it seems to me, etc. 
9. Hyphens: Indication of an awareness that things cannot be 
separated on the non-verbal level, i.e., socio-political-economic 
effects, rather than social effects or political effects only. 
Each of the indices for each of the persons who spoke in the 
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discussions was counted. If no indices were found the statement was 
scored "zero." 
Statements and Extensional Devices 
The frequency of use of the nine devices is shown in Table VII. 
Some individuals who contributed to discussions were excluded from the 
statements' analysis because they were not regular members of the 
class for that semester. 
Several things are indicated simply by looking at raw scores. A 
total of 147 devices used is a small ratio to 623 statements uttered; 
devices one, three, five and nine were not used at all and device 
eight occurs more than three times as often as the next highest num-
ber. 
Etc 
Of the four "zero" devices there was one exception when Subject 
Bused the word etc., (device three) in the following statement. 
B: "Well, he 1 s talking about Daley" let's say, and he says, oh, 
Daley is a typical politician, you know, he is corrupt, etc., etc., 
etc. , he has got a stake in the business, you know and all this. 11 
In this instance, B was not using the etc., to remind listeners 
and himself that there is more to be said; he used the etc., because 
he apparently could not think of other adjectives to describe Daley. 
Simply parroting the etc., when it is convenient does not indicate an 
awareness of its value or meaningfulness in relating language to 
reality. 
It was expected that the etc., would occur frequently because it 
{I) 
(I) 
~ 
(I) 
"O 
TABLE VII 
NUMBERS OF EXTENSIONAL DEVICES EMPLOYED BY 
EACH PARTICIPANT IN THE THREE 
PANEL DISCUSSIONS 
.,.., 
~ 0 ,.... 
,.... . p.. 
(I) E-4 . 
{I) E-4 E-1 4-1 {I) 
...-l . 0 r:: {I) CII . +J . (I) 
(I) . ,.... ,.... ij ...-l . .a +J u ::I (I) <II r:: p. Subjects r:: CII +J ...-l p. ::I ::I 0 :>-. Total Statements H t::l J:;,:I p.. 0 O' O' u ::c: 
Be 15 10 22 287 
D 2 2 13 73 
B 1 1 1 3 8 54 
J 1 2 1 20 49 
A 2 5 44 
N 1 2 1 1 34 
E 2 1 15 
T 1 14 
p 1 1 14 
R 1 1 3 1 13 
Br 2 1 9 
K 1 4 3 3 7 
Rs 3 5 
c 2 3 
G 1 2 
Total O 4 0 11 0 26 25 80 0 623 
Grand Total: 147 
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is such an easy word to parrot or attach to the end of a statement. 
This did not happen. If the etc. can be said to help counteract an 
allness orientation--by reminding us of the self-reflexive nature of 
language and that there is always more to be said--that you can never 
say it all--it may be that panel participants displayed a strong all-
ness orientation. 
Indexes 
Failure to use the indexing device may point out one instance of 
inability to extensionalize principles one seemingly knows. In the 
following statements, Subject A seems to be attempting'to verbalize 
the index device. 
A: "Do you think you know, that you can define liberal, just as 
somebody ••• all encompassing as being liberal, or is, you know ••• 
"like to really get back to the book, you know, you can't step in 
the same river twice, but--
"That if you are not always the same person then you are not 
always liberal or not always conservative or not always moderate or 
something, you know. 
"If you want to use all those labels that a person could be, what 
we would call liberal about one thing and conservative about another 
thing and at different times in his life, you know, could switch back 
and forth." 
Subject A seems to be verbalizing the difference between things, 
that one may not always be liberal or could be Uberal and conserva-
tive; but neither A nor other students remembered to use the indexing 
device as in learning1 learning2, or libera11 liberal2, panel 
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discussion1 panel discussion2 etc. 
Dates 
Closely related to the indexing device is the dating device used 
only once by four different persons. This device dates time, whereas 
the indexing device distinguishes between things. 
Subject A's statement discussed above also could apply to the 
dating device. You may be classified as a "liberal" but you last year 
may not be the same "liberal" today· 
The lack of use of these two devices seems to indicate the stu-
dents did not recognize differences between things, or the potential 
for things to change, over time. These kinds of differences would be 
noted if students had operated first on a low descriptive level--the 
first verbal level of abstracting--before progressing up to the higher 
classification level of description and further to relations levels 
where similarities are heeded and judgments made. 
Look at two of the four examples of dating devices used in the 
panels: The first was in response to the question "Could you vote for 
George Wallace? 11 N: "Not in 1972, I couldn't, no." 
Person N seems to be distinguishing his voting preferences in 
1972 with voting preferences in past, present and/or future years. 
In the second example, subject J says: "We're not trying to put 
our beliefs on you. We're just telling you what we three people 
thought of the panel discussions as they have been presented in the 
spring of 1973." 
"The sp-ring of 1973" sets a limit on the time period which dis-
cussions were evaluated. It would have been more specific if subject 
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J would have indexed which panel discussion(s) he was referring to. 
However, from the context of the discussion, panel leaders (J includ-
ed) made clear they were referring to all panels presented. In this 
sense, the Aristotelian would see no need to index, date or look for 
differences among things (panels) which might imply exceptions to the 
rule (the general classification). 
Operational Terms 
The operational term is perhaps the most difficult device to use. 
It is not as surprising that no examples of it were found. This de-
vice requires what activities or operations are necessary to observe 
certain non-verbal phenomenon. It says, "Do such-and-such in so-and-
so a manner." Operational definitions are a vital element in the 
scientific approach (see page 24) which begins with asking questions 
to direct our observations. What to look for and how to look for it 
involve the operational definitions. 
This is where we define what parts of the territory are to be 
examined and how we are to go about making our examinations. The 
operational definition is hard to deal with because it applies directly 
to the observable world. As has been stressed, the Aristotelian 
(which most all of us are, insofar as we are not scientific) deals 
more often in the verbal world than he does in the non-verbal world. 
He classifies through the use of labels and fits many things into those 
labels, discounting observations on the non-verbal levels which might 
not fit into his man-made symbols. Perhaps an example will help 
clarify the need for operational definition$. The following was taken 
from panel III where students discussed the value of the panel 
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discussions. Although students did not specifically state, "Give me 
an operational definition of the panel discussions so I will know what 
to look for and how to look for it," there were indications that 
students were trying to seek more information. For example: 
A: "Okay, what was it, what was it you wanted out of the panels?" 
E: "Well, the question was, 'Are the panels as presented in 
general semantics this semester providing a means for further under-
standing of the framework of general semantics?' you know:::" 
A: "Uh huh, you said something about, you said benefits and it 
would seem to me, you know that it was some really big thing." 
E: "Well, bernafits to me, is I feel, like I have to internalize 
it, you know, it's just a personal thing with me. Whatever Johnson 
says" 
J: "I think A--what I feel, anyhow, is that the panels as a 
whole, not the class, but the panels, have really not succeeded in 
providing me with a further understanding of the framework of seman-
tics." 
An operational definition could have indicated WHAT observations 
were made and HOW they were made to arrive at the conclusion that a 
further understanding of the framework of general semantics was not 
provided. Without this information or explanation, one has no indi-
cation of how the conclusion was reached or how one might make obser-
vations to arrive at a similar and/or different conclusions. 
The response to J's statement indicates an example of Aristote-
lian logic. Subject B (in the next statement made) seems to say, 
because the panels did not provide a framework for further understand-
ing, they were a failure. (A or non-A) If they were a failure, they 
couldn't be a success. (either-or) N'ote, also in the following 
statement the lack of indexing and dating for panels. 
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B: "Well, I have been in other classes where I felt panels were 
successful and they were, I'd say in subjects that were relatively 
new, to me, so the panel itself can be successful." 
The six statements mentioned above were among the first 20 
utterances of panel III. The topic for discussion was based on an 
unanswerable question to reinforce beliefs. (See E's statement, 
page 71) Throughout the remainder of the discussion panel members 
indicated no change of beliefs about the panels. This was the panel 
where the least number of questions was asked, 30 compared with 68 and 
69 on panels I and II, respectively. Two of the three discussion 
leaders fell in the top four subjects for the most statements made; 
Subject D with 73 statements and subject J with 49 statements. 
Look at the following statements taken from the last 15 utter-
ances of the panel and note how rigidly subject J has seemingly held 
to his initial position. 
J: "We're not trying to put our beliefs on you. We're telling 
you what we as three people thought of the panel discussions as they 
have been presented in the spring of 1973. · 
"And we're not saying the panels were worthless. We're not say-
ing that nothing was gained from them. We're just saying that as a 
tool for understanding general semantics, we think that they have 
been more of a failure than a success. 
"As the three of us are concerned, we have learned more from 
listening to Ward talk than we have in listening to these panels." 
Perhaps the key element of the discussion was "we're not trying 
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to put our beliefs on you," which seemed to say, "We don't want your 
opinions either. Don't rock our verbal world with any confusing ob-
servable data." Without operational definitions for panel discussions, 
participants could not get even close to sharing non-verbal referents. 
Hyphens 
The fourth category where no devices were found was the hyphen, 
which reminds us that things traditionally separated verbally may not 
be separated and/or unrelated non-verbally. Consider the following 
examples which could have been hyphenated: 
D: "R __ , What business is it of yours whether he is a liberal 
or conservative, anyway?" (Apparently he could not be liberal-con-
servative-etc.) 
J: "I think practical knowledge·, theoretical knowledge, I think 
is really off the subject, because first of all we're not advocating 
what you should get out of this course in this panel." (Apparently 
not practical-theoretical knowledge.) 
With the traditional IE language structure orientation, where 
events are viewed in absolutes and one cause-one effect relationships, 
it is not hard to understand that students would not use the device 
which indicates an inability to isolate or sep~rate events on the non-
verbal. 
Consciousness of Projection 
The consciousness of projection was by far the device used most 
in panel discussions. Eighty instances were found in coJllParison to 26 
instances of qualifying terms, the next highe~t count for 411 devices~ 
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This, again was a highly predictable finding, since the consciousness 
of projection terms fit easily and smoothly into our existing language 
structure. It is easy to use such words as "to me," "it seems," "as 
I see it," etc., which indicates that our observations are a product 
of what is observed and our observations of it. It reminds speaker 
and listener that he is speaking for himself not stating something for 
example as an absolute truth, forever true and for all people true. 
It is also the easiest term to parrot, or use without an awareness of 
its meaning. 
The consciousness of projection term preceeded, or followed by, 
an allness statement, an either-or statement or a non-contradictory 
statement can be an indication of parroting--an unawareness on the 
part of the user as to the meaning of "to me." 
In cases where it was readily apparent that the consciousness of 
projection terms were parroted, they were not counted. When it 
immediately could not be recognized, or when there was some doubt, the 
device was counted. Examine some of the following statements and 
notice the ease with which to-me terms are used. 
B: "You have used it several times here, it seems to me you are 
talking about eJq>eriences, you know, that young ladies might have in 
college meeting men." 
B: "And you told me, uh, you gave me no clue as to how things 
really are. Er, not even accurate stab at it, as far as I can see." 
Be: "I learn ••• you see I didn't learn anything as far as I am 
concerned." 
K: "Okay, maybe, maybe I have personally observed a couple of 
people who I feel have learned something in the classroom situation or 
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maybe someone has told me." 
Be: "I don't think you can observe somebody who have learned 
something, unless you have your own personal experience to tell me:::" 
J: "It seems to me and I think it seems to Doug and Ed that it 
is not.a matter of just theoretical knowledge it's more of something 
that has to grow within you." 
J: "I don't know whether it ever should be, to me." 
A: "So, it seems to me that you are saying that we should have 
this theoretical knowledge of it but not a practical knowledge of it, 
I mean, you know, the part where he is talking about how physicists 
look down on engineers for actually using the science, you know, 
when:::" 
Although the consciousness of projection may have been parroted 
more often than consciously employed, it may have had an effect on 
listeners. It is noteworthy that when discussions became disintegra-
tive to the point where people were arguing or talking at the same 
time or even saying, "Okay, so just shut your mouth," NO to-me-ness 
tenns were to be found. (Students' may have been so emotionally 
involved they forgot to parrot their "it seems to me" phrases.) 
In looking at the "to-me-ness" frequencies, we find that Be had 
22, J had 20 and D had 13, a total of 55 out of the 80 occurrences. 
Table VIII compares the number of consciousness of projection 
occurrences with total statements for the highest four persons. 
Subject Be displays a relative lack of the to-me-ness terms. 
Although he has the highest number of occurrences, 22 out of 287 
statements is far less than could be expected, if he were consciously 
aware of the meaning and use of the device. Because thes,a persons had 
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the highest frequency of to-me-ness terms does not necessarily mean 
they were more aware that their statements involved projections of 
their inner states. First we would expect them to have more occur-
rences simply because they made more statements than others. But, if 
they were consciously employing this device they all would have scored 
high on other indexes across the nine devices tabulated. This was not 
the case. It would seem to follow that the person, no matter how often 
he speaks, who is aware of his language behavior and consciously 
recognizes his projections, would NOT be quick to argue with others 
about their words. Notice in Table VIII these persons showed the 
highest rate of signal reactions, by displaying identification when 
they interrupted another person before he had finished completing a 
statement or question. 
Subjects 
Be 
D 
J 
B 
Plurals 
TABLE VIII 
CONSCIOUSNESS OF PROJECTION FREQUENCIES AND 
SIGNAL REACTIONS COMPARED WITH TOTAL 
STATEMENTS IN ALL PANELS 
FOR FOUR PERSONS 
Consciousness Total 
of Projection Statements 
22 287 
13 73 
20 49 
8 54 
Signal 
Reactions 
63 
46 
20 
4 
Eleven examples of plurals ·were found in all discussions. Six of 
these deyices were found among p~elists who uttered fewer stat~ments. 
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In other words, they were not among the most "glib and verbose" 
persons. The plurals serve to remind us that there may be more than 
one cause (thus causes) and more than one effect, (thus effects) etc., 
to whatever we observe or talk about. Johnson suggests that to speak 
of fallings in loves, rather than falling in love, is to suggest by 
implication that love1 is not love2 and that there are many ways of 
falling. To use language in this way tends to avoid undue rigidity of 
beliefs and conduct. It is apparent that panelists were not using 
this device to counteract rigidity. 
Quantifying and Qualifying Tenns 
The two other categories tallied were the quantifying and 
qualifying terms. The former specify exact numerical quantities; the 
latter serve to limit generalizations to more specific conditions. It 
is fairly easy, and not too unnatural, in the existing IE language 
structure to say "three people" rather than "several," or "I k~ow one 
person," rather than "I know of examples," etc. By using qualifying 
terms, generalizations are limited to certain examples of situations. 
Again, to say, "in a class last semester" rather than "in universi-
ties," and "in this particular case," rather than "all situations 
dictate," etc. 
In summary, each one of the extensional devices indicates a 
certain type of awareness of the relationship between non-verbal and 
verbal worlds. The devies go hand-in-hand and have little effect on 
adequate conununication and/or meaningful dialogue if substantial usage 
of all of them is not present. 
Look at some of the following examples from the panels and note 
how easily it might be to use the quantifying device: 
E: "Yeah, I mentioned that twice." 
Be: If you take 20 hours of law would that make you a good 
lawyer?" 
N: Three ag students and a cowboy. 
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In Be's statement the 20 hours was counted as a quantifying de-
vice because it serves to note a specific number of hours. But, note 
the identification displayed in the total statement: 20 hours of law 
EQUALS goodlawyer. Each one of the extensional devices may indicate a 
certain type of awareness of the relationship between non-verbal and 
verbal worlds. But the devices go hand-in-hand and have little effect 
on clear and meaningful communication if substantial usage of all of 
them is not present. 
Signal Reactions 
Recall that Rogers suggests that understanding can be facilitated 
through empathetic listening, (See page 45) or listening WITH someone 
rather than ABOUT him. Empathetic listening means one would make sure 
he understands what someone means. One tries to achieve the frame of 
reference of the speaker or attempts to SE!e the situation "from his 
point of view.II Rogers seems to be saying one would not make value 
judgments based on another's words. 
The signal reaction, or undelayed response would be a response to 
someone's words, in most cases without attempting to fully understand 
what that person is talking about. Con8ider the following series of 
signal reactiens: (note, this notationi::: signifies a signal reaction) 
Be: "Well, if you think that is learning, I mean I will tell you 
that is the old stuff, you know, you spoke of the old stuff, you 
know. You get a professor telling you what Plato said. He wasn't 
there, was he?:::" 
Z: "We have got written records:::" 
79 
Be: "Even the professor who wrote it wasn't there, when Plato was 
alive. I mean:::" 
Z: "It doesn't matter whether he is alive or dead:::" 
Be: "I, I, it:::" 
Z: "It's nice to think about the ideas he brought up. I would ••• 
it could be John Doe:::" 
Be: "Now, wait a minute:::" 
Z: "It could be anybody: : : " 
Be and Z talking at the same time ••• (inaudible) ••• 
Z: ''What source is reliable? It ts just nice to get a whole 
bunch of information:::" 
Be and Z talking at the same time ••• (inaudible) ••• 
It is easily seen that neither person understood or attempted to 
empathize with the other person's point of view. If either of these 
subjects would have asked questions to gain information on lower lev-
els of abstraction or restated the other person's ideas the discussion 
might not have been interrupted with both persons talking at the same 
time. Of the latter, it can be safely said, that "no" understanding 
of statements is shared when persons are talking AT each other at the 
SAME time. 
Disintegrative Patterns 
If, as Rogers suggests, understanding and, thus, maximum agreement 
are gained through empathetic listening, then a listener who reacts 
to the speaker in an undelayed, signal-like pattern nips any chance 
for clear and meaningful communication at the bud. 
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Through empathetic listening, principals try to lay their ab-
stractions end-to-end, so to speak, in order to see the situation from 
the other's view. This seems to imply a conscious effort NOT to react 
signally to another's words as if they meant to the speaker what they 
mean to the listener. This would involve, among other things, that 
the listener restate the speaker's ideas and inquiries to the speaker's 
satisfaction--in short, to delay reaction to delve into what the words 
are intended to symbolize. 
Lee, in analyzing 50 group discussions, found six types of what 
he called "disintegrative patterns." They seem to comprise at least 
a partial anti-thesis to Rogers' empathetic listening notion and to 
the general semantics' principle of delayed and/or symbol reaction. 
When interpersonal dialogues reached any of the six points of 
conflict, Lee observed that the processe,s of understanding often be-
came disintegrative. The following discussion of Lee's disintegrative 
pattern categories hopefully will render evidence to the reader that 
each category involved various degrees of undelayed signal reactions 
which clearly are anti-thetical to any potential empathetic listening. 
In the first of six disintegrative categories observed by Lee, 
arguments were found to move froni issues to personalities. This often 
indicates a person's single-valu~d belief in a belief. If his belief 
IS the fact, then anything perceived as contrary to his belief is an 
attack on HIM, personally, since he is RIGHT and nothing else is 
relevant. If one participant's referent is to the non-verbal level of 
abstraction and other's is based on strictly a verbal definition, 
either of the parties could self-reflex and verbally label the other 
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a fool. Derogatory reverberations often are set in motion and chances 
for agreement on the original issue are lost. 
A similar non-empathetic signal reaction pattern was observed by 
Lee in~ statements, such as: "You're absolutely wrong," "I've had 
years of experience in this," and like statements. The single-valued, 
allness aspects of such behavior seem obvious. 
Closely tied to the issues-to-personalities category was the 
apparent tendency in Lee's studies for some persons to identify 
themselves with!!!!. issue so thoroughly that any criticism of the issue 
was perceived as an attack on the individuals. Here, again, another's 
WORDS about an issue quite likely were seen as expressing ALL a per-
son felt about it. The Aristotelian might say to himself: "If that 
guy feels that way about MY issue, he feels that way about ME, since 
my belief is THE RIGHT one." Unconscious projection manifested in 
signal reaction seems evident here. The person whose beliefs ARE 
reality often identifies a speaker's words with his (the speaker's) 
submicroscopic feelings. 
Lee also observed that some group discussion participants fail 
to deal with a question or argument even after repeated prompting. 
Such behavior could involve many aspects of Aristotelian behavior, 
not the least of which is a person's single-minded attempt to convince 
others that HIS maps are the ONLY ones worth considering. Therefore, 
the questions and/or statements set forth refer to something that 
doesn't exist or are an inaccurate picture of what really exists. To 
such participants, what really exists too often is what they SAY 
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exists. That's all! Period! 
Aligned with the above category, Lee noticed that some partici-
pants charged others with inaccuracies and/or falsifications. To the 
person whose belief IS reality, or whose words ARE ALL the facts, 
others' views stand little chance of being accurate, if not downright 
false. 
Persons who believe their beliefs (unchecked self-reflexiveness) 
without periodic attempts to seek new and/or more reliable evidence, 
often reveal discrepancies in their assertions of THE facts--another 
disintegrative patterns Lee observed. This can happen when the~ 
believer's unsubstantiated belief (a belief about a belief not founded 
by description of systematic observation) obviously runs contrary to 
another person's description of actual observations made. Such con-
frontations often trigger signal reactions. The parties involved 
speak different languages--one based on observation ••• the other on 
belief. 
In this study, the author observed 178 disintegrative incidents 
among the 14 panelists, as shown in Table IX. The average incident 
per person was 12.71 (standard deviation: 15.70). However, the 
distribution of incidents per person was highly skewed to the left, 
indicating extra-ordinarily high incidents among a few panelists. 
Panelists Be and D led the list in disintegrative incidents, 
with 58 and 38, respectively. Their respective standard scores of 
2.88 and 1.61 further highlighted their disintegrative behavior re-
lative to other panel members. 
As shown in Table III, (See page 58) these two panelists also 
showed the highest verbal output, having made 287 and 73 statements, 
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respectively. Also in Table III, Be asked only 24 questions, 8.4 per 
cent of his total utterances. Panelist D asked 21 questions, 28.7 per 
cent of his total utterances. Panelist D once stated in class that he 
had never taken a course that was worth the tuition fee. He then pro-
ceeded to ask another class member what he had learned in college that 
was worth the tuition fee. Noteworthy here is the fact that Panelist 
D, later appeared at the class instructor's h~me, along with Panelist 
J, demanding why he had received a course grade of C. The instructor 
(as told to the author) told the two former class members he thought 
their performance average compared with other class members. It is 
also interesting to note that panelist D had a disintegrative pattern 
standard score of 2.88 and panelist J, a .21. These standard scores 
were computed long after the panelists confronted the instructor 
about the course grade. 
Panelists 
Be 
D 
J 
A 
E 
z 
T 
N 
B 
K 
G 
p 
R 
Br 
TABLE IX 
NUMBER OF DISINTEGRATIVE INCIDENTS AND 
STANDARD SCORES OF THE 14 PANELISTS 
Disintegrative 
Incidents 
58 
38 
16 
15 
13 
11 
7 
7 
4 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
Standard 
Score 
2.88 
1.61 
.21 
.15 
.02 
-.11 
-.36 
-.36 
-.56 
-.68 
-.68 
-.68 
-.68 
-.75 
*Standard scores are an expression of an 
deviation from the mean. 
individual's standard 
At this point, it is noteworthy to examine two examples of 
communications which became so disintegrative that subjects became 
antagonistic and vicious towards each other. The first example is 
preceded by a series of D and A shouting at each other from opposite 
sides of the classroom. 
84 
D: "Why talk politics with someone you already know what they 
are going to say? Why, you know be prepared for a liberal argument or 
a conservative argument?:::" 
A: "You are going into something that, that, I didn't mean. So 
let me explain it." 
D: "Yeah, I don't care what you menat." 
A: "Well, yeah, I know you don't know what you mean, 'cause you 
just told me you didn't." 
D: "I don't know what you mean, but I don't care either." 
A: "Yeah, right, well, you know, it's really not worth talking 
about if you:: : " 
D: "I know:::" 
A: ••• "really don't care:::" 
D: "So just shut your mouth. 11 
Subject D shows a total rejection of anything A wants to discuss 
and becomes so vicious about it he finally tells A to "shut his mouth." 
The disintegrative patterns here involved the issue turning to person-
alities, discrepancies in the assertion of the facts, patterns 1 and 6, 
which also received, overall, the most instances of signal reactions. 
The next example could also be characterized by patterns 1 and 6 
and also somewhat by pattern 2, ego statements. 
E: "Well, I mentioned that twice, to me, it is a personal 
problem. 
I am concerned with my behavior, you know, so if I am to inter-
nalize general semantics:::" 
85 
Be: "You, you, you are wrong. You forced me to make that state-
ment that it is foolish:::" 
E and Be talking at the same time ••• (inaudible) ••• 
E: "I don't want to get into an argument with you about some-
thing silly like that, so:::" 
Be: "No, No, it is not very silly, I mean, I think you made a 
good point. I never said you said something was silly:::" 
E: "I am saying the argument is silly." 
Be: "All right." 
The conversation has been side-tracked from any issue and center-
ed upon "something" (I doubt if either subject knows just what) that 
was "silly." 
Over-all, Table IX, as well as Table III, suggest that the panel 
discussions were dominated by less than half the panelists--most 
notably Be and D. And these higher verbalizers contributed most to 
the disintegrative incidents. Though many breakdowns occurred among 
the higher verbalizers, themselves, some of the low-output panelists 
were put down when they attempted to participate. They subsequently 
fell into the charge-counter-charge syndrome. One woman, a co-editor 
of the college newspaper, said she felt deparessed in the class due to 
her fear of panelists D, J and E. Another class member told the 
author--after D, J and E critiqued the panel presentations that "the 
only thing wrong with the genera} semantics class is those three 
'birds.'" 
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The frequency of various disintegrative patterns was even more 
skewed than the frequency by panelists. Table X shows that 46 of the 
17 breakdown points involved an about-face on issues to a frontal 
attack on personalities, while 48 incidents involved discrepancies in 
in assertions of facts. The average number of incidents in each 
pattern was 29.67 (standard deviation: 12-42). 
TABLE X 
TOTAL INCIDENTS AND STANDARD SCORES FOR EACH OF SIX 
. DISINTEGRATIVE PATTERN CATEGORIES 
Disintegrative Patterns Total Incidents Standard Score 
Discrepancies in Facts 48 1.48 
Attacks on Personalities 46 1.32 
Charge of Inaccuracies 25 -.38 
Ego Statements 20 -.78 
Identity with Issue 20 -.78 
Issue Ignored 19 -.86 
Who were the chief engineers of these high-frequency disintegra-
tive behaviors? Panelists Be and D. They also led the list in ego 
statemtns, as well as in charging others with inaccuracies and 
falsifications--the latter being the third most frequently observed 
disintegrative pattern. 
Regarding the two most frequent disintegrative patterns--attacks 
on personalities and discrepancies in assertions of facts--traditional 
Inda-European language structure implies that a fact is a fact, true, 
right and forever. In such a semantic environment, one tends to for-
get that a fact is a personal affair that is incomplete and ever 
changing and that it's usefulness depends upon the degree to which 
other reliable sources agree with one concerning it. 
Apparently the subjects forgot Johnson's descriptions of facts. 
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The high frequency of signal reactions suggests failure to delay and 
ask questions in an attempt to gain empathetic understanding with the 
speaker. 
The disintegrative attack on personalities can be compared to the 
Aristotelian's notion of good-guy, bad-guy: "You are for me or against 
me. If you are against me, I don't like you." 
One overall conclusion from the class discussions, is that for 
panelists high in signal reactions and disintegrative patterns, 
couununications more frequently broke down and/or failed. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study investigated language behavior employed by students 
enrolled in a general semantics class in the spring of 1973. It looked 
for clear and meaningful communication--the sharing of referents for 
symbols--and at the points in discussions where dialogue followed 
disintegrative patterns--where understanding broke down and people 
talked AT each other, rather than WITH each other. 
Even though students were studying the extensional devices they 
did not use them in their own language behavior during the three panel 
discussions analyzed in this study. They knew general semantics 
"jargon" but seemingly didn't understand how these word-symbols might 
relate to their abstraction processes or facilitating communication. 
The Aristotelian orientation showed strongly in four persons, Be, 
D, J, and E who consistently ranked far above classmates on all dimen-
sions under study. Because the asking of questions is an important 
part of the self-corrective nature of scientific abstracting the number 
and kinds of questions asked were analyzed. For all but two subjects 
far less questions were asked than statements made, indicating that 
panelists were more eager to impress their ideas and beliefs on others 
(as the close-minded, Aristotelian person might) than they were to seek 
information about others beliefs in order to revise or restructure 
verbal maps in line with non-verbal territories. In essence, the person 
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who asks few questions is the one who seldom stops to consider that his 
information might be incomplete or innaccurate. 
The extensional devices were used as indices of clear and mean-
ingful conununication. These devices help to remind one of the rela-
tionship between language and reality. If consciously used language 
becomes more precise, accurate, specific and potentially more clear and 
meaningful. The consciousness of projection device, (to-me-ness) which 
helps counteract the is-of-identity was the most frequently used 
device. This was no doubt due to the ease with which the to-me is 
parroted and attached to the ends of sentences without actually realiz-
ing its meaning or relationship to the observer-observed phenomenon. 
Four of the devices were not employed by any students and the 
other three received minimal counts. The extensional devices go hand-
in-hand and without substantial use of all of them one can be 
relatively "certain" that their meaning is not being understood. 
The most supportive finding of the lack of clear and meaningful 
connnunication was found in the disintegrative patterns, isolated when 
one person interrupted another before he had finished speaking. Al-
though arguments and disagreements of opinions can often lead to solu-
tions for problems, when participants begin talking AT each other at 
the SAME time, it is a fairly sure bet that meaningful communication--
empathic communication--is not occuring. Those students who were the 
most "glib and verbose" interrupted others most often and had the 
highest number of disintegrative patterns. 
Though the findings are quite clear-cut and highly supportative 
that students were not extensionalizing the discipline and were not 
communicating with clarity and meaningfulness, it is difficult to 
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generalize to the class as a whole and their performance in the discus-
sions. The author did not attempt to measure how much those students 
who did not speak and those who spoke very little, had learned an ex-
tensional orientation. It is strongly suggested, if further work were 
to be done in this area, that researchers tes.t participants with open-
closed-mindedness scales, extensional, intensional agreement indexes or 
other methods which would yield more infonnation about individuals under 
study. 
Although there is no test DATA from this study available, one 
might conclude from the content analyses findings that students who 
come into the class with a high degree of close-mindedness and/or dis-
play a high degree of Aristotelian orientation may be UNTEACHABLE in 
this situation; conversely those who are more open-minded and less 
Aristotelian may be more receptive to the discipline and be more 
willing to try to understand it. This is clearly evidenced by subject 
D, who appeared to be one of the two highest most Aristotelian individ-
uals in the class, said he didn't think this class or any he had taken 
was worth $14. For an individual of this mind-set, the author doubts 
whether ANY instructional device or educational technique would 
effectively enhance a greater understanding. 
The Panel Discussions 
The panel discussions were structured to give students a forun 
whereby they might learn more about the processes of abstracting by 
observing their own and others language behavior. As an educationaJ 
and learning technique, the panel discussions may have been effective 
for some but generally students showed a lack of understanding of 
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extensional devices, signal reactions and the value of questions. Be-
cause discussions were largely dominated by a few students, it is not 
possible to determine how much learning or understanding occurred in 
those students who didn't speak often. The panel discussions, in 
another class, at another time, might have been more beneficial. 
If the panels are to be used again, the author would recommend to 
the class professor that he clearly state the purposes and goals of the 
panels. Some confusion may have resulted because students were not 
exactly SURE what the purposes were; this element of certainty may be 
necessary in the structure of the game to provide a framework for 
students to operate within. 
The author would also suggest that certain students be appointed 
as observers; and they report their impressions of the discussion 
immediately after the panel discussions. This would provide an element 
of feedback which might be helpful for panel leaders and class members. 
The professor should also act as a source of feedback innnediately 
following the discussions. 
The author, after observing students in general semantics classes 
over several semesters and after having gone through some kinds of 
behavior re-orientations as a result of the class (and other things) 
would question if general semantics is the kind of discipline which can 
be taught in the tiaditional professor-student classroom structure. 
Students might gain a greater understanding of general semantics if 
they were asked to teach it to each other. Perhaps each student could 
devise his own instructional methods and be responsible for presenting 
some aspect of the discipline for one week's time. Students might 
choose to analyze language behavior used by politicians, journalists, 
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their friends and enemies, Dads, or whatever. Emphasis. would be on 
discovering HOW general semantics principles can be applied to communi-
cation behavior and WHAT changes in thought and speaking are found 
when it is applied. The possibilities are limitless, but since many 
people seem to "rebel" to the subject matter, (as panelists D, J, and E 
all did) it may be more productive to have students analyze other's be-
havior and discuss it before they are asked to work on their own 
behavior language patterns. 
For Further Study 
Our personal and social problems, insofar as they are human 
problems, often arise from our use and/or misuse of language. As 
Johnson says, we can talk ourselves into a host of delusional fantasies 
if we are unaware of the relationship between words and reality. 
More work needs to be done in the areas of communication and 
language behavior. The author found it difficult in this study, to 
work with taped discussions. Often times there were problems as to 
whether a student was asking a question or making a statement since 
some of the questions were mixed in to and intertwined with statements. 
A panel of judges could be used effectively here to rate statements and 
questions and thus, enhance reliability. 
Operational definitions should be modified and sharpened; partic-
ularly those which deal with 1) operational terms, 2) quantifying 
terms and 3) qualifying tenns. These were the most difficult to 
categorize. 
It would also be interesting to examine communication dialogues 
from the opposite side of the coin: NOT clear and meaningful 
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communication, or the degree or Aristotelianism. This could include 
analysis of allness terms, identification, elementalism, unchecked 
self-reflexiveness, confusion of fact and i.nference, multi-ordinality, 
etc., etc. 
It would be beneficial to the researcher to give before and 
after tests to subjects to measure the amount of change in orientation 
or over time and these might be accompanied by attitudinal or similar 
criterion measures which would help explain more about the subjects. 
For Panelists 
For members of the spring 1973 general semantics class, Dan Piel 
high school teaching, Kemmerer, Wyoming, 1972 found that the following 
questions helped him to understand what apparently the panel discus-
sions couldn't and/or didn't do. Perhaps the reader will find them 
useful. 
1. What did I "really" say? 
2. What did I "really" mean? 
3. To what extent had I inferred something that was false to 
fact? 
4. To what extent had I reified the abstractions that I attempt-
ed to deal with? 
S. What attitudinal sets do I really possess? How can I be-
come more aware of those which I am not unaware? 
6. To what extent can I operate as an idealist and still adar>t 
and survive? 
7. Etc ••• 1 
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Etc. 
Dr. Malcolm S. MacLean, Jr., Professor at The University of Iowa, 
School of Journalism provides a thought provoking message which seems 
to me, an appropriate "etc." for a study on general semantics and 
communication. He says: 
It seems that we can never say all that we know. And, we can 
2 
never know all that we say. 
FOOTNOTES 
loan Piel, "Whale Hunting with Ahab or Missing the Boat," _Etc., 
Vol. 30, No. 1 (New York, 1973), p. 64. 
2Dr. Malcolm s. MacLean, Jr., Journalism Professor, The University 
of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, Remarks from a lecture given on November 
15, 1973. 
Oc: 
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APPENDIX 
PANEL DISCUSSIONS 
Panel Number I 
A: So what were you people basing your stereotypes on in the 
first place? 
V: Through the contacts of what we had seen in the mass media. 
You know, things like radicals burn buildings, radicals take 
over, you know, liberals go wild, whatever. 
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And uh, just through our interpersonal contacts, people calling, 
oh, there's the freak, you know. 
Oh, John, yeah, he's a freak. 
A: So you were basing your stereotype on inferences and not on 
fact. 
V: Right, we had, we perceived a stereotype that other people 
held, and in essence we held a similar stereotype. 
You see what I mean? 
I mean, we can't separate ourselves from, from what we observe. 
You know, because we are part of that and in order to recognize 
it, we had to realize that we had it to. 
And some people might try to define it completely differently 
than we did. 
A: Did you find that persons who you thought fit into the 
stereotype had stereotypes of their own, of people outside the group 
that were based on as much inference as other people were based? ••. 
I think I lost myself. 
N: Do you think hippies, in other words, you are saying ••• 
You think hippies thought themselves to be hippies, were meeting 
certain criterion? 
A: Yeah, were they giving ••• did they think they were part of 
that stereotype because, they were making the same inferences other 
people were making? 
Or, uh, and at the same time were they making inferences about 
people outside the stereotype? 
Br: You mean the straight ••• (inaudible) ••• 
A: Yeah. 
V: I think, probably in some areas. 
100 
Yeah, the people within the group that we classified, or the 
people that I talked to that looked to me like they might fit this 
subculture, I think they had certain stereotypes about things, about 
some things. 
And other things, you know, very individualistic about. 
N: Then on the other hand, you know, I looked at the other side 
of the picture where I found exactly the opposite. 
In other words, I termed a person as a straight and found that, 
you know, he classified some of the things that V talked about in 
terms of where a person lived, or pre-marital sex, or that sort of 
thing. 
Br: Yeah, so in other words you look at someone who has short 
hair and is dressed neatly and you think he is straight and you talk 
to him and he::: 
N: Found the same classification that V had in the people who 
she found that fit this particular category. 
M: You suggest that these stereotypes, or labels, these particu-
lar labels should be, uh, be done away with? 
V: Uh, No, I don't think they should. 
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I don't think you really can do away with them. 
I am not advocating that they should be done away with. 
But, but I think people should take care of, in how they use them, 
on what level of abstraction they are talking about. 
Because I can point to you and I can say, you know, hippy, and 
that is on the first order, observable labeling level. 
But hippy one, two, three or four? 
What hippy, under what conditions at what time? 
I think, you know, that you need to take care in how you use 
them. 
N: I think if you took the example of a parent, saying somebody 
was extremely long-haired, they would label that person even before 
they knew the individual. 
You know, as opposed to say, you know, somebody who really was 
and you know, and he would fit that particular label anyway. 
D: You are labeling parents pretty well there. 
What about the parent who has a long-haired kid? 
N: Well, I didn't conclude by saying that all parents are that 
way, but you know, I know that some parents are upset with their sons 
with long hair. 
I could draw that conclusion. 
D: Not mine. 
M: I think that it is really, that you would, want, you wouldn't 
want to do away, even intellectually, with these stereotypes or labels 
but rather find possible other ways •.• 
Choose when and where you want to use them. 
V: It seems that when you use a word like this it doesn't say 
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very much about the person. 
When you say that someone is a liberal you haven't said very much 
of anything. 
At least if you are saying that to me, because your referents for 
liberal may be completely different from mine. 
And we could not even communicate at all; not share similar 
meanings, whatsoever for liberal, or freak, or hippy or anything else. 
Br: I think what we are trying to say is, you know, we don't 
necessarily have to do away with the labels, but when you are using 
such a term, you know, maybe think about it before you use it or maybe 
try to, uh, how do you say it, explain why you are using that term::: 
V: What it means to you?::: 
Br: Yeah, what it means to you. 
Because everytime, everytime you use a term like that you are 
using it from your viewpoint, which may not be the person you are 
communicating with's---on the same level, so you know. 
Be: Yes, earlier you said, that you spoke to certain people who 
you thought fit into certain categories. 
Now can you tell me, from what you have done, and from the few 
remarks you have, do you think this is a state of mind, or reality? 
You know, hippy really is a state of mind. 
You know, hippy, radical, liberal, conservative, whatever is 
just a state of mind, or what he knows about himself, you know, the 
reality about it. 
N: I don't know::: 
V: I think it is a word about a word. 
Be: Do you say that explains that? 
V: No, I don't think it does. 
Be: I don't know what my answer is ••• (inaudible) 
You cannot answer it. 
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N: The people that I talked to didn't seem to, you know, think, 
or well, I don't know how to explain it either. 
But they didn't feel that they fit categories just because they 
were, you know at that level. 
J: Seems to have been a big hangup about the word hippy because 
most of the people you have talked to seem to have indicated that you 
have to have lived in a commune to be a hippy. 
And that may be their self-perception of it, but I think that the 
mass media and most people would not classify communal living as a 
prerequisite for being a hippy. 
Maybe, maybe you are labeling by asking the person if they fit 
that label. 
You know, and they don't know what else to use. 
V: Yeah, I think what you are saying, maybe points out the 
different meanings that people have for the label hippy. 
Because I think N, didn't you say that two of these people that 
said hippies were people that lived in communal situations, they had 
before lived in a communal situation and considered themselves hippies 
at that time, but they didn't now? 
N: Yeah, the last two people. 
W: Did you bring this up in the questioning, this communal 
living? 
N: No, I didn't~ 
Br: I didn't either. 
I just asked them to define the hippy life style, what does it 
mean to you. 
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N: And the reason I find it significant was because of the type 
of person that I asked. 
Three ag students and a cowboy and I was just surprised to find 
them. 
Br: I was really surprised too, because I never thought that 
would come out in the definition at all. 
I don't know why. 
V: I think that might be a reflection on the mass media, kind of 
perpetuated by the media. 
Because you read stories, you know, about the communal living and 
about these people, you know and::: 
Yeah, did you have a question B? 
B: Yeah, when you say you talked to, uh, when you say meanings, 
you know, or when you say, oh, businessmen, what does that mean to 
you, or politician, what does that mean to you, or hippy, what does 
that mean to you, which, uh, what uh, lets talk about meanings. 
Uh, what are we t.alking about? 
Uh, are we talking about what that person means to me, like in a 
b. s. conversation, or are we talking about that politician, or does 
this mean we have some value to me, as far as my relationship with him 
is concerned, how I interact with him ••• 
Uh, it seems to me that you are not going to, to deal with this 
politician. 
You can sit around and b. s. about him, however, I see how the 
meaning could, the meaning could upset a person. 
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For instance an old lady that has a meaning, has a meaning, uh, 
has a stereotype about hippies and she is driving down the street and 
it is dark and she sees a hippy. 
She is operating off this map, that hippies are bad. 
She gets upset, you know, really shook and she has an accident. 
Okay, when she is operating this meaning has affected her. 
It has affected her map, it has-affected her. 
' . 
As far as I am concerned, if you are somewhere, where, uh, you 
don't have to come into contact with hippies, it doesn't make any 
difference what the meaning is, does it? 
V: I'm I'm, I'm not, not quite sure I understand what you are 
saying. 
B: Well, uh, I'm trying to put this to use in problem solving, 
you know. 
Here we have this enlightment about stereotypes. 
Well, what value is it to us? 
I mean, this is great, here we are talking hypothetically about 
how people affect us as stereotypes. 
Okay, we've got these stereotypes, you know. 
V: Well, if nothing else, it might point out that our stereo-
types are, are inaccurate, they don't relate to any observable reality 
very well, 
I mean, they are just very high level inferences. 
B: Allright. 
Okay, once I know this, how well, how is this going to help me 
live a better life? 
V: How do you mean? 
B: How does this help me, in trying to communicate? 
V: R can you answer him? 
R: Well, I don't know if I can answer him or not. 
But the first thing that comes to my mind, although this might 
not af feet your life personally, this particular label; I'd say you 
could perhaps look at it as a consistent, uh, thought process. 
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If a person's internal maps don't match the territory in this 
particular, in this particular case, well, its very possible in other 
cases, in other situations or whatever, a person's thought processes 
might go through the same erroneous uh, thinking. 
So, if it's true in this particular case, you might not ever have 
an affect on you. 
You might not ever come into contact with anybody who would blow 
over what you defined as hippy. 
But, but it is a thought process, a thought process you go 
through in this particular situation, well it is very possible it is 
going to overlap into other areas of your life, so your maps aren't 
matching your territory. 
B: Well, this would help me, uh, I understand that, maybe, this 
time we talk about hippies, but next time maybe it would be my brother-
in-law. 
Is that what you are trying to say? 
R: I think so::: 
B: Maybe something to that effect. 
So how would that help me, so next time, uh, someone sits down 
and starts b. s. ing about politicians, and I say, well wait a minute, 
you know ••• 
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Well, he's talking about Daley, let's say and he says, oh, Daley 
is a typical politician, you know, he is corrupt, etc., etc., etc. 
He got his, has got a stake in the business, you know, and all 
this. 
And I say wait a minute Jack, uh, you know, what do you know 
about Daley, really, you know? 
Is this the way I break this guy down, you know, to the level of 
differences, you know, is that what you are saying? 
T: I think your concern should be with yourself, B. 
How you feel you label people. 
B: Well, I am trying to say is that when you communicate with 
people you tend to throw stereotypes around, right? 
And you know, some people may use stereotypes around you and you, 
you may not understand what they are saying, right? 
And you know, some people may use stereotypes around you and 
you, you may not understand what they are saying, right? 
So you might have to break them down to see if what they are 
saying is, uh, has some truth. 
Right? 
As well as, uh ••• (inaudible) 
T: Uh, when you talked to, uh, when you just pick out broad 
categories, ag majors, and you found out that not all ag majors were 
cowboys::: 
N: Right. 
T: Uh, but you were looking for people that were cowboys and you 
wanted to::: 
N: No::: 
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T: Well, I can imagine the stereotype in my mind. 
N: I thought the guys that I talked to were cowboys, because [ 
had 'em in class last semester. 
That's why I went to them, because I knew them. 
P: That right there, when you say cowboys, is a stereotype. 
N: Right, right, I said that when I began, you know, that I 
classified them, not-hippy like, because of my own labels. 
I did label them that way. 
I labeled them as straights. 
Bx: Is it possible for me to describe somebody in college, who is 
specifically called liberal? 
P: Well, if you take enough time, I assume you can::: 
W: What did you ask Be to specify someone you label liberal? 
Be: You know, I, I don't have a conception of a group as being 
liberal, but I think I have an expectation of what a liberal looks 
like. 
When you say, well, well, that I think a college professor, you 
know could have ••• 
W: Well, you are off base right there. 
At least here. 
Be: Pardon? 
W: On this campus anyway. 
Be: Well, I you know, I wouldn't say that here, but I would say a 
college professor on the East coast, you know, or in the North, that 
he is liberal. 
V: Just by virtue that he is on the East coast or in the North? 
Be: Yes, that would be for the education, you know. 
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V: Don't you think there might be differences that would make a 
difference between those professors? 
Be: No, it depends, I don't::: 
V: Do you think it would be impossible to find someone that is 
not a liberal that is a professor on a campus in the East or in the 
North? 
Be: Oh, you could find one not so liberal, I mean your chances of 
running across such a guy would be about one in one-hundred, you know. 
That is comparing with the South here. 
A: Why do you, why do you think that would be so? 
Be: Why do I think that would be so? 
Possibly because, I think I need to explain myself. 
Because I think, I may be wrong, you know, I don't say I am 
right. 
I think people in the North and in these schools have attracted 
people from ••• (inaudible) ••• you know, broader backgrounds. 
You know, and from the experiences I have talked to people here, 
I have been in school here, I have been in school in Indiana and I 
have been in school somewhere else, and I have my idea of what a 
college student should be. 
But since I have been down here, I couldn't find, you know, the 
typical college student of my expectations, you know. 
Because most people I talk to are either they live within five 
miles from Stillwater and haven't been out of Stillwater in their lives 
and they are not determined to get out of Stillwater. 
A: Why do you think that a person to be liberal, has to have, 
sort of, a broad rounded background?::: 
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Be: I very strongly believe that. 
To be liberal, you know, to be what is the term liberal you have 
this broad base, out of college, out of the student environment of 
education. 
A: Well, what I am asking, is, is you know, is what are you 
basing the fact that a person to be liberal must have, to be well 
traveled? 
Why do you, why do you say that? 
What do you base it on? 
Be: Well, I mean, if you cannot see the whole geographical 
relief, you know, if you have then, you remain very small in relation, 
you know, to what you are. 
I mean, surely, if you live in Stillwater, you won't meet ••• 
(inaudible) ••• 
Br: What is your definition of a liberal? 
Be: Definition of a liberal. 
Well::: 
Several people talking at once ••. (inaudible) ••• 
O: Well, I've lived in Stillwater all my life and I voted fo1 
George McGovern, so that, you know;::: 
N: and I lived in the East and I'm conservative. 
And I know half the members of the faculty and half as many jobs 
or more jobs than I had all over the country---all over the world. 
They weren't liberal. 
Be: Well, I am not trying to define liberal::: 
Two people talking at same time. 
N: No, its inference agnin, you know? 
Inferencing. 
Be: Well, you are supposed, you can always say the supposed 
definition. 
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I mean, this always has been the trouble, trying to fit somebody 
into, liberal. 
I mean, when do you say you have conservative, in what regards? 
N: Dress, uh, mannerisms, life style, uh::: 
Be: What life style? 
N: Simple 
Be: You say you are conservative because of your dress. 
I mean, I dress, you know, anyhow, I dress when I feel like, you 
know, I don't think that is a good assumption as such, you know. 
I think you dress you know, just simply how you feel that day. 
You know, I dress according to how I feel that day. 
I could wear jeans for weeks, if I feel that way. 
And then you say the life style. 
What, how do I fit in that way? 
You think that is a conservative element? 
I mean, you have some radicals with, with wives and children too. 
I don't think that is, is radical::: 
N: To me that is what I am infering as a conservative. 
To you it is probably something else. 
Maybe you can't make the judgments between just those things, but 
you know, politics might be::: 
Be: Yeah, to me, if I would refer to you as a conservative I 
would ask you this. 
Could you vote for George Wallace? 
N: Could I vote for George Wallace? 
Be: Uh, huh. 
N: Uh, probably. 
Be: I don't want probably, yes or no. 
N: Not in 1972, I couldn't, no. 
Be: Just quit qualifying it, you know, I mean, yes or no. 
Only on that condition. 
Don't give me any::: 
N: Today? 
Be: Anytime. 
Yes or no. 
N: Yes 
Be: Then you fit into that category as such. 
112 
A: Do you think you know, that you can define liberal, just as 
somebody all encompassing as being a liberal, or is, you know ••• 
Like to really get back to the book, you know, you can't step in 
the same river twice, but ••• 
That if you are not always the same person then you are not 
always liberal or not always conservative or not always moderate or 
something, you know. 
If you want to use all those labels that a person could be what 
we would call liberal about one thing and conservative about another 
thing and at different times of his life, you know, could switch back 
and forth. 
Be: I think you got the meaning wrong. 
The word conservative. 
See, why we use that word, is to call people who do not believe 
in change for change's sake. 
That is the meaning of conservative. 
A: Well, I don't agree with your definition of conservative. 
Be: We have a dictionary here, if it would help. 
W: Be: Did you say a conservative does not believe in change 
for change's sake? 
Be: Yes. 
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A: Do you think a liberal believes in change for change's sake? 
Be: Well, a liberal is someone who has an open mind on any issue. 
We don't, we may think in conservative words to see how a certain 
element has been prepared, and if you can give him a good reason for 
changing his mind on any issue, you know, that the conservative has, 
you know, that has always been this way ••• 
That is the way about him. 
Br: You said something about loo.king it up in the dictionary, you 
know. 
Haven't we already dispelled the?::: 
Pc: I have, I, you see we don't want to get too much into each 
other's opinions. 
I just want to look into it for my own purpose, you know, to pin 
it down to certain things. 
R: According to that, then, I would have to label you a con-
servative if you want to possibly go to the dictionary. 
Be: No, no, not, you could label me a conservative, yes, because 
you are. 
W: Now we know what it is, R. 
Be: You are already taught to look it up in the dictionary and 
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that could be a frame of reference, you know, not as a credible 
source, just as a frame of reference. 
D: R, what business is it of yours whether he is a liberal or 
conservative anyway? 
Why should you even care? 
R: Well, I don't, I am just saying that::: 
D: Why should anybody care? 
Why just sit around and talk about whether somebody is a liberal 
or a conservative or anything, you know---man or woman, or whatever. 
That is the whole problem when you get into any kind of labeling 
and you start making inferences and stuff. 
him? 
Why should you care? 
A: But, if you are going to interact::: 
R: Why use he::: 
D: 
A: 
D: 
Do you have to label them to interact with them? 
Well::: 
I ... ... 
A and D talking (shouting) at same time ••• (inaudible) ••• 
D: I, I, have to know he is conservative before I can talk with 
A: No, but· if you want to, if you want to, you know, interact 
with him and have some basis for knowing what to expect out of him 
you are going to make some kind of label, not necessarily a label that 
is going to stick, you know, everyday or whatever, but in order to, 
you know, have some idea of what he is going to do, I mean what you 
can expect of him::: 
Be: Why do you have to talk to someone on the basis that you 
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know what to expect from him? 
I mean, now if you were to, you might want to talk to him. 
Just give him a chance. 
Why do you have to have that? 
D and A talking (shouting) at the same time ••• (inaudible) ••• 
D: Why talk politics with someone you already know what they are 
going to say? 
Why, you know, he prepared for a liberal argument or a conserva-
tive argument?::: 
A: You are going into something that, that, I didn't mean. 
So, let me explain it. 
D: Yeah, I don't care what you meant. 
A: Well, yeah, I know you don't know what you mean, 'cause you 
just told me you didn't. 
D: I don't know what you mean, but I don't care either. 
A: Yeah, right, well, you know, its really not worth talking 
about if you:: : 
D: I know::: 
" A: Really don't care::: 
D: So just shut your mouth. 
A: Well, you know, you were asking, why is it important to add 
these labels. 
I was trying to tell you what my reasons were for having some 
label. 
So, if you don't want to know I won't tell you. 
But, if you do, I··· 
D: What, well, what, what would you label me? 
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Okay, you've talked to me a couple of times, what would you 
label me? 
A: 
D: 
A: 
D: 
A: 
D: 
I don't 
of your 
W: 
I ... ... 
Okay, you gotta have a label for me. 
I have::: 
You want::: 
I haven't talked to you enough to give you 
Okay, well you are not going to talk to me 
want you to give me a label because I don't 
business. 
We're making progress D. 
END OF TAPE 
a label yet. 
any more, because 
think it is any 
Panel Number II 
Be: Well, I think you have to bear with me for the next ten 
minutes. 
I am going to be very subjective, make judgments and I welcome 
criticism from you. 
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I have been in school for almost 15 years I hope, and I haven't 
learned anything. 
Just nothing. 
R: You what? 
Be: I haven't learned nothing from school. 
And I would like to ask anyone here if he has learned anything. 
I would like to know what he has learned so far. 
From my observation, since I have been here, I found that the 
education of an average American kid stops at high school. 
After high school, they just don't learn anything. 
They just remain in school either through the obligations brought 
upon them by their parents or by the society which, well, I'll explain 
myself further. 
Let's look at the system. 
The system is so structured that it is designed to do certain 
things which means to produce diploma waving kids ••• those who can 
make it •••. and by so doing the $ystem is big enough as a result of 
which you have what you call the mass production education. 
And you look around the classes confirms that. 
In an average class about 100 kids, white, you sit next to the 
next guy and he or she doesn't speak to you. 
All he does is to take notes and listen attentively to what is 
going to be covered in the quiz next week or something like that. 
Surprisingly I have observed that students go along with this, 
because everyone wants to make it. 
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The professors on their part, are concerned with that, well, on 
the catalogue, the class lasts for one hour. 
Very often you get a lecture for 45 minutes under the excuse 
that they give you 15 minutes to get to your next class. 
So after 45 minutes he stops talking. 
More or less, they go on and on and give you the same stuff you 
have been getting the past semester so very few of them even bother 
to up-date it. 
In my previous college at Indiana University, there was a con-
flict, you know, when the guys, they started to fail quizes and all 
those things and there was a demonstration. 
So the regents, the board of regents realized that, well, these 
kids started causing trouble because of the lack of, you know, they 
complained that the professors are not teaching them anything. 
So they made out a ruling that in the fall, a month before the 
semester begins, every professor should turn in a---what you call---
a plan of study which is what the course content will be. 
They give that to you about a month before so that you know 
what you are getting into. 
As a result of that, the kids would just take the course content 
and look through it an if they think it was so tough that they 
couldn't get it, they wouldn't take that course. 
So he wouldn't go to class to learn anything. 
He is going there to perform. 
After that, that is the end of it. 
Then you have the categories of the students you find in this 
country. 
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As far as I can see there are about three or four categories. 
You have the girls who purposely come to college to get married, 
to find a husband. 
Invariably, they spend two years in school. 
Within two years you get hung up with somebody either you move 
to live with them or one way or the other they get married and drop 
out of school. 
And say, well this is the kind of education I want. 
That is the end of the career. 
And then you have a second category, who just want to come and 
have a nice time. 
And these are the group who really come because they got along 
with the kids they knew from high school. 
They don't care how long it takes them to complete their educa-
tion. 
On the average they spend about six years getting their under-
graduate degree. 
Then you have a third category. 
Nice kids from middle class family who want to get away from 
home so that he or she could experiment, 
You get the guys experimenting with drugs, you get the girls 
experimenting with men. 
They date several kinds on campus; black, white, pink or whatever. 
You know they go into it without any purpose, just to have the 
experience and after they have the experience for four years 
(inaudible). 
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So, I would say on the average, it would be better if you could 
take correspondence courses rather than coming to college to fool 
around and say you are learning anything. 
In fact, very few people interact, in that you always find people 
going along with people who agree with them. 
K: What kind of first level observations are you basing these 
categories on and these labels that you are putting on people? 
Be: My point of view, I made that clear from the onset. 
My point of view, you have to accept it. 
K: Okay, you are aware that you are operating on a higher level 
of inference then, by saying that their are three types of people and 
that people do not work when they come to college. 
And that all people ••• you are taking an observation that you have 
observed in real life and you are generalizing it to ••• 
Be: wait, ••• 
K: You think that every one, ••• 
Be: Well, I by and large, if you are sincere with yourself by and 
large, you know which you fit in out of these categories, you know. 
A: You think there are no other categories than those three that 
you mentioned? 
Be: If I missed out any categories you can inform me and I am 
prepared to learn about that. 
I told you, if I miss out anybody, come back. 
B: Could you qualify your statement about learning? 
You have used it several times here, it seems to me that you are 
talking about experiences, you know, that young ladies might have iii 
college meeting men. 
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Well, that in itself is a learning process, so I'm not sure if I 
understand what you mean by learning ..• 
Be: Learning is---learning, you see---I'm not here to define what 
learning means, you know, because if I give you my own definition O' 
learning and you do not like it--so I am not going to define it. 
R: Well, where did you get this information that you are 
disseminating right now? 
Be: Where did I get the information from? 
R: What you are telling us right now .•• 
Be: You are getting the information from HE. 
R: No, how did you acquire 
Be: The information is 
R: Did you learn this? 
Be: I didn't learn it. 
I refuse to learn it. 
B: You know ••• 
from 
it? 
my own observations. 
Be: I repeat, I still have some facts ••• 
B: If you bring us down to learning, you know, I think it is 
important now, that I understand what you mean. 
Because it seems to me that you are using it in such an abstract 
way, that I'm not really picking up any meaning that you are sayinf·,. 
And if your meaning as far as learning goes---if you could jm, t 
maybe break it down and see what you mean in two or three ways, so 
that as far as learning is concerned you know, it could be in relation 
to the objectives of the university, you know, or it could the 
objective of the students ••• 
A: Be ••• 
Be: I am not qualified to tell you what learning is and this is 
what is so difficult to get to know what is really happening in that 
the professor doesn't know what he is supposed to do, you know. 
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In terms of learning, the kids who come to the university don't 
even know what he is supposed to do in.terms of learning so I will Le 
very unqualified to tell you what learning is and that is it. 
A: Be, if you are unqualified to tell us what learning is, then 
how can you tell us that nobody comes to learn? 
I mean how can you tell us .•• 
Be: I am being subjective. 
You either take it or leave it ••• 
A: I know you are being subjective, but I am saying •.• 
Be: talking ••• inaudible. 
A: talking at same time ••. inaudible. 
Be: Wait a minute ••• 
A: Be, look at ••• 
Be: Take whatever I say on face value. 
And if you like you can take it personally and the way you like. 
I have no qualms about it. 
May I proceed? 
Come down to this. 
Come down to this learning in the (student) union. 
In the first place, when I came here, the first place I went was 
the union. 
I found out the student, you know, it is strongly segr.egated, you 
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know, because a lot of the times I (inaudible) 
But the fourth floor, which is supposed to be the grouping area 
for the students, was supposed to be on the first floor, instead of 
the fourth. 
Because in my previous university, it was on the first floor, 
whereby anybody going to their classes could pass through that place, 
he either stops or he doesn't stop, you know, so that you have the 
first floor standing for the fourth floor area. 
(inaudible) 
There you have the kind of community where you have various 
aspects of the university life represented. 
You pass through the union on your way to class and if you want 
to have a coke you stop and have your coke. 
If you want to relax, you relax and if you don't want to you 
just walk to your classes. 
Now, to get to the official areas. 
You have the blacks on one side, and in the corner where there 
is never nobody else but the blacks. 
At this time you have about 50 of them on one side. 
'• I think that you have to run your own mind, opinions, whatever 
you want to call it. 
Which is, if you think that you have learned anything since you 
have been in school, you are free to come back at me. 
Yes, I won't take it very seriously. 
And I hope that when you view a learning process it will be when 
you leave this place. 
F: Are their any other conunents or questions. 
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We are running out of time. 
D: Did you have a category for the rare person who does happen 
to pick up something, you know, they feel is worthwhile? 
I don't mean to insinuate that I am one of those persons, be-
cause I am not. 
Do you have any category ... 
Be: People who ••• 
D: That accidently managed to learn something in the class-
room ••• 
Be: I don't think I have seen anyone so far in that, has learned 
anything. 
B: Well, I can definitely say that, uh, I didn't learn anything 
from what you said ••• 
Be: Oh, fine ••• 
B: At least, I feel, I foel that you operated off a very high 
level of inference ••• 
Be: Oh, yes, you ••• 
B: and you told me, uh, you gave me no clue as to how things 
really are. 
Er no even accurate stab at it as far as I can see. 
It was all too abstract, uh, you wouldn't break anything down 
into differences that make a difference. 
Uh, didn't tell ••• 
Be: No! I mean, let's face it. 
Give your previous professors, how, they haven't been able to 
break it down to you. 
How can I do that? 
If there ever was to be, I mean, the task must be impossible! 
Someone. Where did you learn the things that you know now? 
Be: What, where did I learn? 
Someone. Where did you learn the things that you know now? 
Where did you learn them? 
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Be: I learn; you see I didn't learn anything as far as I am con-
cerned. 
If, if, just certain types of knowledge. 
But, my observations, I have my observations, from going through 
the process, you know, I mean I just have to have a piece of paper 
now. 
A: Be, since you have admitted to this high level of inference 
do you think your observations have any validity at all? 
Be: By and large, unless you people don't want to admit it. 
K: How about your observations, Be, you know, whose truth is 
correct? 
You know, you get into opinions as such and maybe, maybe the 
inferences that we have are based on a different physical realitX, 
on different first order observations that we have, you know, you have 
to realize that too.::: 
Be: I couldn't care less::: 
K: You couldn't understand? 
Okay, maybe, maybe I have personally observed a couple of people 
who I feel have learned something in the classroom situation or mavbe 
someone has told me. 
Okay, this is a first level order of observation and so from that 
I can infer that there are two people in OSU who have learned 
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something:: : 
Be: I don't think you can observe somebody who have learned some-
thing, unless you have your own personal experience to tell me::: 
Kand Be talking at the same time. 
Be: I mean, if you have learned something, come, tell us here and 
tell us what you have learned, you know::: 
K: Okay, by the same token, I don't think that you can tell me 
that, that, you have observed people who have not learned anything, 
because it is not possible, to walk through a whole day and not learn 
anything at::: 
Be: It is quite easy to make, you know, I don't deny that. 
It is easier for me to make observations, to see on the abstract 
levels, which I said earlier, I am not denying that. 
But, if you want to counteract what I have said, you have to tell 
me what you have learned since you have been in school. 
A: If you don't tell us what you consider learning is, or 
something that can be learned, I don't think its worth really talking 
about::: 
Be: No, I look, you can tell me what learning is, I don't know, 
you can tell me. 
What do you think learning is? 
A: No, I'm not, uh, telling, you, you're telling us, all thei;e, 
you're making all the observations::: 
Be: I'm not telling you, I mean, you have got to figure it for 
yourself •••• (inaudible) ••• tell me::: 
A: No, I'm not interested in telling you, because I'm not::: 
Z: (to A) I'm interested in what you have to say learning is::: 
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A: (to Z) Okay, Okay, I' 11 tell you in just a minute as soon as 
I make my point • 
What I am saying is you're making, you're telling us of your 
observations and making these inferences, but not telling us what you 
consider learning to be::: 
Be: I told you, I, I, am not con1petent to do that. 
ltere is the problem: : : 
T: How are you competent to say nobody's learned then?::: 
Z: If you can't define it::: 
Be: Your conscious, don't::: 
T and Zand Be talking at same time ••• (inaudible) ••• 
Be: Let us get down to this word learning. 
I mean, this is just a word too::: 
T: You centered your whole discussion around it. 
Be: Learning? 
No, I did not::: 
T and Be talking at same time ••• (inaudible) ••• 
Be: Wait a minute, this is not talking. 
I know you cannot be very objective about it. I think the di};-
cussion on what you ought to, I mean, you must have been hearing some 
false words somewhere, because if you really want to say, to define 
learning, you have your chance to tell me, 'look here guys, I have 
learned this, I have learned this, I have learned that,' I mean, yc)U 
can explain my theory. 
All right? 
As long as you can come up with something concrete. 
I mean, just as I said::: 
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J: Be, since this discussion really is not so much about whether 
we have learned or not, because we haven't been able to define what 
learning is, it seems like it is more like does a university education 
lead to anything or is it beneficial. 
Now, I don't know that::: 
Be: I wouldn't say that::: 
J: I have learned things::: 
Be: Tell us what, tell us::: 
J: How what::: 
T: Tell him what you (J) have learned. 
J: Okay, for instance, I have learned many minesctial facts about 
political science which is my major. 
Now, I am not going to sit here and regurgitate all that to you, 
and I'm not even going to make a value judgment on whether or not what 
I have learned is useful. 
But for my own definition, I think for the definition of taking 
in a fact and being able to remember it, and use it possibly::: 
Be: Thank you::: 
J: If you don't define what learning is this whole discussion 
is pointless. 
Be: Thank you very much, you have come to the whole point. 
You have come to the point. 
You are the only person I have seen so far, contribute something 
to the discussion because you said that you have learned facts about 
political science. 
All right. 
What are the facts that you have learned? 
J: Do you want me to regurgitate them.::: 
Be: No, not everything. 
Facts about political science, political system, or political 
people, of what kinds of facts you consider::: 
J: Well, I could spend a r,ood hour telling you what I have 
learned over the past four years. 
If you want me to do that? 
Be: No, thank you. 
I don't think that would help you a lot: 
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J: Well, I don't think that's going to help the discussion much 
either but the point is, you've got to define::: 
Be: Oh, no::: 
J: We've got to define what learning is or this whole discussion 
is just up there floating::: 
Be: Wait a minute. 
How do, now, you asked me a question, I will give you an answf·r. 
How do you think what you have learned in your political science 
study, or whatever you call it, is going to help you? 
T: Help you what? 
Z: I think I can answer that question from my, my purpose: : : 
Be: Yes, go ahead. 
Let's have it. 
A: Real general, generally, I have learned some ideas from Plato 
some Marx ideas. 
I took a course in logic which taught me a certain process of 
thinking. 
I use that in my everyday life to help me be more analytical--
130 
it was a scientific study on logic, you know, how to, and I use that 
every day in my life, daily life. 
I also took a class in music understanding and comprehension 
which helps me to understand music better, now that I know what to 
listen for: : : 
Be: That is a good student. 
She has learned some of Plato. 
Plato died in, in::: 
Z: Yes, but his ideas are very valid::: 
B: Before Christ::: 
G: Be, I wanted to read when I was about in the third grade. 
I guess, and in the summertime, I have to read, occasionally, I 
have to read an order or tell what color a signal is, or something 
like that and that helps me make about $1,000 a month in the summer 
time: : : 
Be: So that is your definition of learning. 
I think we are getting somewhere ••• (inaudible) ••• 
B: Yeah, well, I have not learned any absolute truths, I don't 
think or anything, facts of things, like know what the obvious. 
But I have learned to share meanings, uh, of my fellow man and by 
that, uh, maybe you ought to ••• 
We share meanings of words. 
You've learned how to read, uh, so I've learned, uh, I believe, 
to share meanings, I think, uh, with my fellow man. 
Be: Well, if you think that is learning, I mean I will tell 
you that is the old stuff, you know, you spoke of the old stuff, you 
know. 
You get a professor telling you what Plato said. 
He wasn't there, was he?::: 
Z: We have got written records::: 
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Be: Even the professor who wrote it wasn't there, when Plato was 
alive. I mean::: 
Z: It doesn't matter whether he is alive or dead::: 
Be: I, I, It::: 
Z: It's nice to think about the ideas he brought up. 
I would.,, 
It could be John Doe::: 
Be: Now, wait a minute::: 
Z: It could be anybody::: 
Zand Be talking at the same time ••• (inaudible) ••• 
Z: What source is reliable? 
It's just nice to get a whole bunch of information::: 
Be and Z talking at the same time ••• (inaudible) .•• 
Be: We are trying to define learning in this discussion, and ] 
think we are getting at it now. 
What do you think you are learning? 
You know, you think that you are learning facts and I say. 
Why are you shaking your head? 
Say what is on your mind. 
B: I don't think I am learning facts, and I don't think, I hope 
these people don't think they are learning facts or truth. 
Truth, you know, as it really is. 
They are learning words, that, un, they're as close to the truth 
as we can verbalize. 
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The way we share meanings, these are our accounts, you know, what 
we talk about in this class. 
Where people get hung up is where they do take these truths, they 
do take these as facts, they do take what they read as is what 
actually Plato said. 
Be: I wish that, are you speaking for the whole group or are you 
speaking for yourself? 
Be and B talking at the same time ••• (inaudible) ••• 
B: I am speaking for myself::: 
Be: Oh, well you say this group::: 
B: Well, I certainly hope they don't think these things are 
absolute facts. 
That words are facts. 
Be: Now, I don't see how, that can help you to be a better 
person. 
As far as I am concerned, because::: 
G: Be, do you have an idea of learning as personal growing? 
Is that what you consider as learning, as you grow? 
Be: Yeah, I mean you define it now. 
That is what I consider learning. 
You may have your own defini.tion of learning. 
Z: Be, why are you at a university? 
Be: Well, just for the same reason why you are here. 
E: Tell me why you are here::: 
Be: Well, I, I, ... . . . 
E: And I'll tell you if that's the reason why I am here. 
R: Tell us why he is here, I mean::: 
Be: Well, I::: 
R: You ought to know::: 
Be: He is here to get a piPce of paper, I mean that is all::: 
V: How do you know unless you ask him?::: 
Be: How do I know?::: 
N: How do you know I am here to get a piece of paper? 
Be: Pardon? 
Three people talking at sm11e time ••• (inaudible) ••• 
O: How do you know he isn't here to get a degree? 
Be: One thing, a degree is a piece of paper. 
Three people talking at same time ••• (inaudible) ••• 
J: That is not the point, Be::: 
Be: No, I am, I am telling him why he is here::: 
E: Why are you here?::: 
T: Well, I'm glad to hear that! : : : 
N: Be, Be, you mean, I am sitting in class for three or 
years to get a piece of paper? 
Be: What do you want to get out of here? 
· Do you not want to get your degree? 
four 
D: Be, I think everybody is getting down on Be here, just 
because they are having so much trouble justifying their existence 
here. 
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C: I would like to propose for us to get away from this hangup 
about trying to define learning, and uh, he has his, uh, own opinions 
about why he is here and you have different ideas. 
You go on what you learn from, uh, out of classroom discussion 
and/or from classroom learning. 
So why don't you tell something about what you learned, or you 
may say that::: 
Be: I think that this::: 
C and Be talking at same time ••• (inaudible) .•• 
Be: They are interested in why I am here. 
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I am here because, to get the kind of job I want I have to have 
that piece of paper, period. 
A: Did you know anything for that job, before you got here? 
Be: Oh, it doesn't matter::: 
Be and others talking at same time ••• (inaudible) ••• 
Be: I still have to have that piece of paper, right on! 
V: I feel like I am learning something right here from this 
whole discussion::: 
Be: That is::: 
V: About myself and about you::: 
Be: Yes::: 
V: And your projections and your level of abstraction and how I 
react to you and how you react to members of this group and that is a 
very valuable learning experience for me::: 
Be: I think I think that is what we are trying to do here. 
To try to learn from one another, that is what I came out with 
all this crap. 
I mean, you can talk all you want to about it, but I don't know 
whether you are sincere when you say that you are learning or when ,ou 
say (inaudible). 
V: Be, let me ask you, do you feel like right now, that you are 
learning something? 
135 
Be: Uh, I have learned that a lot of you are stupid! 
Several people talking at the same time ..• (inaudible) ••• 
V: Have you learned anything about yourself and your reactions 
to people? 
Be: Sure, sure, sure, sure. 
V: What? 
Be: What? 
Well, I mean I would have to sit back and analyze, you know, I 
can't give you a definite answer right now. 
T: You've set here and you 1ve ••. everytime somebody •• 
You ask people what, what they have learned and they've said 
something about philosophy or something and you say well, you didn't 
learn anything. 
So obviously you have a definition of learning that doesn't fit 
you know, anything they say. 
It doesn't fit, into, into your definition of learning, so you 
must have some defintion for learning. 
So what is it? 
Be: I will not::: 
T: You've said what it isn't. 
Whatever anybody says::: 
Be: Wait a minute, wait, wait::: 
No, learning, I have said by inference what is learning, if y,m 
can take that. 
V: Perhaps, something that is interesting to me, is your and 
some of the other people in this room to include myself, but your un-
willingness to change your existing beliefs and opinions. 
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People have said thing to you which have tried to contradict, or 
combat what you have said and you have sort of tried to::: 
says. 
Three people talking at same time ••• (inaudible) ••• 
D: So has everybody else in this class .•• 
Two people talking at same time •.• (inaudible) ••• 
D: Everybody else in this class has refused to accept what he 
So nobody else is any better::: 
V: That's what I said, I said all us us included; Be and the 
rest of us::: 
money. 
D: I think it all brings us to a question of economics. 
I don't think this class is worth $14 an hour. 
I don't think any class I have ever taken is worth that much 
Someone: Well, D::: 
D: If I get a job it might be worth it later on::: 
Be: Uh Huh! 
He, - you have come down to my point. 
I think I finally find somebody to agree with me. 
D: Yep, I agree with you. 
J: It is just an unanswerable question, you know, if that is 
what we are trying to talk about::: 
Several people talking at same time ••• (inaudible).,. 
Be: I am not in a position to judge you or anything. 
Alright? 
You can judge for yourselves. 
I have said my piece. 
And if you like it you can take it or you can leave it. 
A: Isn't that what you have done though, is judge, by putting 
everybody in categories and telling us that we haven't learned any-
thing? 
Be: Yeh, No. 
That I am not sorry for that. 
B: Be, isn't there some way •.• 
State your position now and you might be able to get a large 
number of these people here to agree with you. 
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But I think that the problem lies in the fact that we aren't able 
to understand. 
In other words, we are operating on such a level of abstraction 
that; that if you were to break this down somehow, so we could really 
get the meaning of what you are saying in terms of what your saying ..• 
I'm saying that you might get all of us to agree with you, if 
you would break it down, to understand. 
I can't understand your, your position::: 
Be: Wait a minute::: 
D: Do you want them to agree with you?::: 
Be: I don't, thank you. 
I don't necessarily want you to agree with me. 
I mean, I could come in here and talk about the good, the good 
to you and you would be happy and you would walk out of this class;:, 
happy person. 
I do not do what you want me to do. 
O: I think the big stumbling block in this whole discussion l1as 
been, ah, a value judgment on learning not learning itself, but the 
value of learning. 
Because I think everyone would have to agree that you have 
learned something in school; how to write, something minescual, 
whether it is important or not. 
That's irrelevant, but what we are talking about ••• 
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I don't think anyone can say they haven't learned a single thing 
in class. 
know. 
Be: Oh, that's what, what I::: 
O and Be talking at same time ••• (inaudible),,, 
Be: That is why I say the education stops at high school, you 
A: How do you know our education stops at high school? 
Be: Don't be impossible--really::: 
A: Well, don't take it personally. 
I am just asking you how you know that our education::: 
Be: That is why I say what I say::: 
Three people talking at same time ••• (inaudjble) ••• 
P: Be, Be, I have a direct question. 
You said, that, one statement you made is that education stops 
at high school. 
That is pretty high level abstraction. 
Right? 
Be: Yes, sir. 
P: Okay, now, you know the first question this book says we 
need to ask says, "What do you mean and how do you know?" 
What do you mean by education? 
Be: Process of learning how to read and write. 
P: Okay, okay, that is education, learning to read and write? 
Be: Yeah. 
P: Okay, does that stop at high school? 
Be: Yeah, you don't come here to learn how to write. 
P: Does it even start in high school? 
Be: Pardon? 
P: Un, I learned to read and write before I was even in high 
school. Does that mean my education stopped?::: 
Be: Now wait a minute. 
Don't get me wrong. 
You see, ! ... (inaudible) •.• 
A: That part of your definition, once we start learning how 
to read and write which would have been the first, second and third 
grade ... ::: 
Be: No don't hang onto that. 
That is not that important. 
Take it::: 
A: Well, I think it is important. 
Why isn;t it important? 
Z: I would like to agree with you on the point that a lot of 
classes here at college are just like high school. 
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But I think a person can have his own motivation to either go to 
the library, interact with people and learn from, on their own 
motivation. 
D: Z, why go to class, though, in the first place? 
Can't you get that without spending $4,0001 
Z: You can, it's just a::: 
D: See if you can get a high school education equal to that, 
without going to high school.::: 
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Z: I think one thing that exists about the college atmosphere is 
that you are exposed to--rather than in a high school in your home 
town;--you are away from your parents, you make your own decisions, 
you're exposed to others::: 
D: Well, yeah::: 
Z: You're exposed to a whole bunch of ideas. 
You are exposed to a whole lot of things that you can do on your 
own::: 
D: Yeah, you can do that by moving somewhere::: 
Z: Right. 
But it is just that it is more convenient to be where there is 
a lot of::: 
D: Well, there is::: 
Z: You can learn things from teachers::: 
Be: But the fact remains that I need to get a piece of paper. 
Z: Pardon me? 
Be: The fact, that I need that, you know, for the piece of paper. 
END OF TAPE 
Panel Number III 
A: You said, a long time ago that you didn't think anybody got 
to the benefits out of this class, that maybe they wanted. 
thing. 
What were these benefits that you wanted? 
D: Who made that statement? 
A: Waht? 
D: Who made that statement? 
J: Ed did. 
D: Ed? 
E: I don't even remember v1aking the statement. 
A: It was the first thing you said. 
And I wanted, you know, to see if you would come up with any-
Something about, you wondered if we got any benefits out of the 
class and the answer was no. 
D: Oh, you mean his original question. 
A: Yeah ••• 
D: And he answered no. 
That was I believe he said the panels. 
I don't think he said the class. 
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A: Okay, what was it, what was it you wanted out of the panels? 
E: Well, the question was, are the panels as presented in 
general semantics this semester providing a means for further under-
standing of the framework of general semantics? 
You know::: 
A: Uh, huh, you said something about, you said benefits and it 
would seem to me, you know that it was some really big thing::: 
E: Well, benefits to me, is I feel, like I have to eternalize 
it, you know, it's just a personal thing with me. 
Whatever Johnson says::: 
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J: I think, Andrew, what I feel, anyhow, is that the panels as 
a whole, not the class, but the panels have really not succeeded in 
providing me with a further understanding of the framework of seman-
tics. 
B: Well, I have been in other classes where I felt panels were 
successful and they were, I'd say in subjects that were relatively 
new, to me, so the panel itself can be successful. 
But, it's a two-way street, like any other educational process, 
in my opinon. 
It takes a little push as well as a little pull and it takes a 
little effort and creativity on the part of the panel, since guide-
lines weren't established and expectations aren't set. 
Find, maybe that is one of the things semantics is about, you 
know, about. setting your own expectations and getting, waht, uh, 
looking for things that you would like to get out ot it::: 
D: Well, I think if that is true then I think probably the 
possibility to cure that is to make the panels voluntary. 
B: I didn't hear you. 
D: I think possibly a cure for that would be to make the panels 
on a voluntary basis. 
W: Yeah, I like the idea and I've thought about it. 
E: Do you have any more suggestions as to how this problem 
might be overcome?""" 
W: I don't feel it is a problem::: 
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J: Well, you see it is a problem to be overcome::: 
D: Yeah, well, I have some suggestions. One is, one suggestion 
obviously would be to do away with the panels. The second suggestion 
would be to do away with the class, I mean there are all kinds of 
answers to::: 
J: I think that one thing that could be done is, and this is 
an administrative problem, according to Dr. Ward, is, is to cut this 
class in half at least and perhaps have it meet on a nightly basis for 
three hours.at a time, once a week so that people have the ability to 
get to know each other a little bit::: 
E: and interact::: 
J: Yeah, and throw things around. 
Like I think it would be much more beneficial and you'd get much 
more discussion if people knew each other, if they had a lot of time to 
discuss things and if it wasn't just a matter of picking out the broad 
categories out of the air and talking about them that is really 
artificial. 
I think, just, the everyday response to natural events, you 
know, I think we could elicit more, probably more geniune responses 
from people than in these cut and dried categories. 
S: Well, I'm not familiar with the panel discussion, actually. 
Uh, uh, what are the guidelines that were layed down?::: 
D: You don't know?::: 
S: What did you have::: 
D: Were you here at the very first? 
Would you like for us to review it for you again? 
S: No ••• 
D: Would it be beneficial? 
S: Beverly can tell me here ••• 
Be: ••• (inaudible) ••• 
D: ••• (inaudible) ••• 
Be: You said something, I feel I didn't hear you on a certain 
statement. 
You said that it would be foolish for anyone to think that 
after 15 weeks in this class you could go out and save the world. 
I don't know actually, wh[,t you mean by that statement, but if 
I can give you my impressions, you are saying that after 15 weeks of 
general semantics you learn everything, you still can't perform, is 
that it? 
E: ••• (inaudible) ••• 
Be: Am I right? 
I just want to get it straight. 
144 
Now, what do you think the objective of any class is, semantics 
aside, let it be economics, law, anything? 
If you take 20 hours of law would that make you a good lawyer? 
E: No. 
The answer to that question, to me is no. 
Be: No. 
I am just trying to boil it down to my impression to hours, and 
how many hours in the class. 
I think, if I understand the objective of this course very well, 
it is trying to get to you again individual. 
I mean you can't bring your girl into this class. 
I mean, people around, people you get in touch with, you know, 
it is an agreement to pass on what you know::: 
E: Yeah, I mentioned that twice::: 
Be: See what I mean::: 
E: All three of us have::: 
J and D and E talking at same time ••• (inaudible) ••• 
Be: I like to talk to one person at a time. 
All right? 
J: Can I ask something? 
Be: Yeah, what is it? 
J: All right. 
Be: Speak what is it? 
E: Well, I mentioned that twice, to me, it is a personal 
problem. 
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I am concerned with my behavior, you know, so if I am to inter-
nalize general semantics ••• 
Be: You, you, you are wrong. 
You forced me to make that statement, that it is foolish ••• 
E and Be talking at same time ••• (inaudible) ••• 
E: I don't want to get into an argument with you about something 
silly like that, so::: 
Be: No, no, it is not very silly, I mean, I think you made a 
good point. 
I never said you said something say was silly::: 
E: I am saying the argument is silly. 
Be: All right. 
J: I think, I think one thing that might clear up what Bisi is 
saying is. 
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I think another thing which could be done maybe, to change 
the class bit, if we have to stay in this particular format, I think 
the people who did the earlier panels were really seriously handicapped 
because as time went along, more information was revealed to you and 
I think and the chances of you falling into some of these semantical 
traps was probably less, you know. 
So perhaps, maybe, you know it was more beneficial to do the 
reading, and get through the chapters and then do the panels, you know, 
rather than having this kind of gradual build-up process, you know. 
I think the panels at the end had much more beneficial informa-
tion than the others and Bisi, what we're trying to say, is, were not 
attacking the class::: 
Be: No, no, no,::: 
J: May I go ahead?::: 
Be: What I was saying::: 
J: Okay, yeah, but what Eis saying, is that I think it is more 
of a personal thing. 
As I view it the panels are tyring to, to bring out this 
personal thing in to the public arena where it can be used in a public 
debate and I think that, that, perhaps is very hard to do with only a 
semester's worth of semantical work under your belt, you know. 
Be: Yeah::: 
J: I don't know whether it ever should be, to me. 
Be: You say you should do the course and then the panels ••• 
(inaudible) ••• 
That is one condition for the course, for passing the course. 
Well, the professor comes in and says, this is the text book 
for the course and I want everybody to read it and understand it in 
one week, you know::: 
J: Well, why, why one week? 
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Be: ••• (inaudible) ••• just to get everybody to know what is going 
to happen because you want to sp-nd the rest of the time on the panels. 
J: I don't see any reason why we should limit it to one week. 
Be: Well, I mean::: 
D: Be, if you are going to apply that to any period of time, 
you are assuming that the attention would be on the panels, uh, which 
I would be opposed to. 
I mean, I just can't see that. 
They are not entirely worth it. 
I mean, I've got better ways to spend my time, you know, for 
better purposes, you know, like I don't particularly care to come here 
on Mondays and listen to panels. 
I enjoy listening to W---that may be personal selfishness, I 
don't know. 
I just don't like the idea of getting up here and giving a 
public confessional of your knowledge or lack of::: 
Be: Well, do you really want some structured lecture?::: 
D: Well, I really don't think W has ever been noted for 
structured lectures. 
But, I, I, I have to admit, I'd just as soon listen to W rave up 
there as listen::: 
E: Got a question over there? 
P: As far as everybody up there says as I understand agrees, we 
need to internalize it, that it be put.into use for that purpose, you 
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know, it's for our own individual benefit. 
But if we do the panels, it is all fine and grand to to sit up 
here and listen to W lay it out for us, we can sit home and I guess, 
just self-ref lex a little of this through our heads. 
We have to practice, it you know, and this gives us, maybe, gives 
the opportunity to, or potential to practice it here in the class, you 
know, at least to see it--the action before us. 
Somebody is going to be talking, we really::: 
D: I, I, I think your argument is pretty well done away with by 
the fact that with the panels there was very little::: 
P: I'm not saying that that did happen I just think that the 
potential existed::: 
D: Oh, I don't even know, I don't::: 
E: Well, if the potential exists, but you know, was it realized? 
Three people talking at same time ••• (inaudible) ••• 
V: Uh, I think basically I'm I'm trying to hit on the same point 
that, that you've talked about that general semantics should be a 
discipline where you, where you learn and where internalize the 
discipline of general semantics. 
And to me, and I don't know how many others of you, but to me, 
the purpose of the panel discussions was not to argue the knowledge of 
the topic, it was to look at, or examine the language behavior of, of 
the people and of yourself in terms of the questions you ask and the 
information that they gave and the exchange of dialogue. 
And so for me, it was a very beneficial thing because I could 
look at what the people were saying and look at what I was saying in 
relation to general semantics. 
I mean, I think the panel discussions become, you get out of it 
what you put into it::: 
D: You couldn't::: 
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V: I don't think you can expect a panel discussion to give it to 
you, you've got to take out of it and you've got to apply what you, 
what you understand, you know, about general semantics to that. 
D: You couldn't have done that without getting up in front of us 
and talking about hippies, or something? 
P: You can't do it unless somebody is talking to you and you are 
talking to them. 
D: You mean you couldn't have, you mean you have to have panels 
to do that? 
P: You don't have to::: 
D: You don't have::: 
V: You don't have to have, but that's one method::: 
D: Yeah, that is one small tool. 
But why take one third of the class the entire semester to do 
that one small thing that I would feel, anyway, its just like any 
other course. 
If you want to get into it to that extent, you can do it. 
A: What would you suggest, to do, to practice this method of 
making inferences and asking questions? 
D: Well, I, I would personally suggest as far as this semantics 
and my limited knowledge, and you know it is very limited, and I 
think, maybe more so that anyone else in this class, but I would 
suggest that this whole thing be entirely enternalized, because I think 
semantics can be a very dangerous thing to yourself if you use it 
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incorrectly. 
Now, I think a lot of people would go out with this, you know, 
little small knowledge we have of semantics and examine, uh, an issue 
of the day and use it as a reinforcement tool and that's all that I 
would feel, you know, that it is just very possibly continually 
reinforced their liberal and/or conservative or radical whatever their 
beliefs may be. 
They constantly use it to reinforce those beliefs by saying that 
the other beliefs are abstract and they are higher levels of abstrac-
tion and they are just a bunch of crap, you know. 
Because they understand what the other guy is talking about--the 
guy they agree with--they feel he is not abstracting high and it could 
be dangerous tool, you know. 
So I don't feel that it should be entirely internalized until you 
felt, I don't know if there is such a point, I don't know, maybe W 
could tell us--if he felt maybe there was a point where you could::: 
Two people talking at same time:::(inaudible) ••• 
P: I wouldn't think you would have to internalize it to 
agree::: 
D: Well, I mean, in other words, just keep it to yourself. 
Don't bother other people with it. 
That is what I mean, you know, just, you know, just think 
about it to yourself. 
Just don't go bothering other people with it, saying::: 
P: What you're talking about::: 
D: Do you have !FD or do you have FDS or whatever it is. 
A: What you're talking about seems to.be what in Johnson's book 
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he says that you should be aware of. 
Uh::: 
D: Well, is Johnson always right?::: 
A: No, he is not always right, but I think in this case he is 
right, that::: 
D: Okay, that is just fine, just don't, I don't think::: 
A: Okay, well::: 
D: Johnson is entirely right::: 
A: Okay, let me finish what I was saying first, so you will know 
what you are arguing about::: 
D: Oh, well, I mean, it's not important::: 
A: So, it seems to me that you are saying that we should have 
this theoretical knowledge of it but not a practical knowledge of it, 
I mean, you know, the part where he is talking about how physicist look 
down on engineers for actually using the science, you know, when::: 
D: Yeah, well what I was saying is more than that. 
I can see its practical knowledge, but its, you know, just a 
practical knowledge of just sitting here and thinking that they are 
saying, well, uh, just sitting here and thinking they're not coming 
out and blurting it out, you know, until you have--
Okay, it's just like I go into the lab and try to work out a 
thing and if I don't know how to use it, I'm going to screw it up. 
Just like semantics. 
If you go out and try to use it now, you're going to screw up. 
So I am saying you can use the practical knowledge when you have 
a good basis to do so. 
D: I suppose W could tell us exactly when that would be ••• 
J: Could I add something here? 
I think practical knowledge, theoretical knowledge, I think is 
really off the subject, because first of all we're not advocating 
what you should get out of this course in this panel • 
• 
We're not trying to put our beliefs on you. 
We're telling you what we as three people thought of the panel 
discussions as they have been presented in the spring of 1973. 
And we're not saying the panels were worthless. 
We're not saying that nothing was gained from them 
We're just saying that as a tool for understanding general 
semantics, we think that they have been more of a failure than a 
success. 
As the three of us are concerned, we have learned more from 
listening to W talk than we have in listening to these panels. 
I think there are ways to fix the panels. 
I am not anti-panel. 
I'm not anti-discussion. 
It seems to me and I think it seems to D and E that it is not a 
matter of just theoretical knowledge it's more of something that has 
to grow within you. 
It's not something that can be automatically called out of the, 
a discussion about welfare, or something like that. It's more of an 
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internal took that you use internally in a regular day to day basis in 
small things, rather than in debating hot issues of the day. 
We're not trying to, we're not trying to convince you of this, 
because, I, that is pointless, you know. 
And if you don't agree, that is fine. 
Be: It seems to be very' antagonistic to us - Wand the course. 
I think by so doing, you are trying to voice an opinion. 
You are attacking OSU and most of the students. here because if 
students have chosen to come out here and take courses ••• 
END OF TAPE 
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